Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2002-09-04-Speech-3-037"
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"en.20020904.1.3-037"2
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"Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, I believe that the conclusions of the informal Elsinore Council were reasonable; it agreed to explore all avenues for a non-military solution to this problem, including sending in inspectors. However, for this to succeed, for example getting inspectors into Iraq, means Saddam Hussein honouring his obligations. That needs to be made crystal clear. We cannot allow him to act as judge and jury here. There needs to be broad agreement that Saddam Hussein must go. But this can only succeed if various viewpoints are taken on board. Unlike Mr Sakellariou, I believe that pre-emptive wars are acceptable. However, they are only acceptable if there is evidence of immediate danger and proof that there is a greater risk than without a pre-emptive war. Such evidence is not forthcoming at present and we can therefore see no justification for war.
Nor has proper consideration been given to whether starting such a war and terminating Saddam Hussein's regime would not lead to changes in other parts of the Islamic world involving far greater risks than allowing Saddam Hussein to remain in power. Destroying the coalition against terror and establishing fundamentalist regimes in the ‘moderate’ Arab countries could have very negative consequences, particularly for us in Europe. This needs to be weighed in the balance if we wish to succeed. For example, we also need to consider what the direct consequences of such a military conflict would be for Iraq's minorities, given what Saddam Hussein has done to the Kurds or other population groups in the south of his country in given situations. This all needs to be taken into account in weighing up the situation.
We Europeans, however, can only drive forward this process of weighing up the situation if we have a common view. That is a prerequisite. Neither Mr Blair's position on one side nor Mr Schröder's position on the other is very helpful in trying to reach such a common stance. I believe that the only way to stop the Americans going ahead unilaterally is by means of such a united approach. There is a debate raging about this even in America itself. If the US is aware that we in Europe are presenting a united front on this issue, it will be possible to get certain points accepted.
Since 11 September, approaches have been adopted that may be understandable but are nevertheless dangerous. Since the events of 11 September, Article 5 of the NATO Treaty has been discussed but not implemented, because implementing it would have meant that we in Europe were involved in joint strategic planning and decision-making. So we Europeans have to ask ourselves this fundamental question: Can we position ourselves as partners and take part in the decision-making process, or we will just be ordered into action when the decision has been made and a war is imminent? This also has fundamental implications for future transatlantic relations.
Parliament should endeavour to support the Council and the Commission in pursuing this common policy approach, because that is the best way of both getting rid of Saddam Hussein and avoiding a war."@en1
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