Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2002-07-03-Speech-3-306"

PredicateValue (sorted: default)
rdf:type
dcterms:Date
dcterms:Is Part Of
dcterms:Language
lpv:document identification number
"en.20020703.10.3-306"2
lpv:hasSubsequent
lpv:speaker
lpv:spokenAs
lpv:translated text
". Mr President, about two years ago a conference was held in Brussels to mark the tenth anniversary of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings. During the conference, all the speakers spoke unanimously in favour of the virtues of this Regulation, which is somewhat unusual for expert opinions. I agree with these opinions and with this positive assessment. The Group of the Party of European Socialists has tabled two amendments: the first concerns the need for the efficiencies that could counter the ill effects of a concentration on competition to include the maintenance or creation of employment. In fact, this is a version of the failing company defence principle, which has already been applied by the Commission and which we believe would improve the report if reflected in the text. I also believe the report would be improved by the content of the second amendment, which asks that, in concentration cases, not only competitors, but also consumers, and, where appropriate, representatives of the workers concerned, be considered as interested parties. In putting forward the proposal to amend the Regulation, however, there is one opinion that must be pointed out from the start. The positive assessment of the Regulation does not prevent suggestions being made with regard to partially reforming it or adapting it to the requirements brought to light by experience, but, in any case, these reforms will be limited. The text of Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 itself stipulates that certain aspects should be reviewed ten years after its entry into force. Now that this period is over, the Commission has issued a Green Paper suggesting that not only the points laid down in the Regulation, but also those allowing the text to be updated, should be analysed. This is a very positive initiative on which the Commission should be congratulated. Perhaps the most important points of this Green Paper concern the definition of the thresholds at which concentrations are considered to have a Community dimension and, secondly, the hypotheses whereby a concentration notified to the Commission could be referred to the national authority or authorities for analysis and a decision and, vice versa, whereby a concentration notified to the national authorities could also be referred to the Commission. In the first of these sections, the Commission suggests that the concentration should have a Community dimension if it needs to be notified in three or more countries, thus eliminating the complicated procedural rules contained in section 1 of Article 3 of the Regulation. Certain national competition authorities have protested against the amendment of this section, or its replacement by criteria other than those of the Commission. We cannot agree with these objections. The rule on the automatic assigning of competences proposed by the Commission allows for greater clarity and simplicity, promotes uniform assessment criteria, increases legal certainty and saves companies money. We therefore support it wholeheartedly. The second of these sections, regarding the referral of cases, is more complex, and the European Parliament and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs have therefore made some suggestions. The first concerns the suitability of parties consenting to the referral of the case by the European Commission to one or more national authorities. If joint handling is considered more effective and saves companies money, it appears that, under the referral process, companies cannot be obliged to submit different cases against their will. In another section, the European Parliament warns the Commission of the problem caused by this referral process when the final decision rests with the political authorities and not with independent authorities. Account should be taken of the fact that in several Member States, the decision is taken by a political authority, such as in my country, for example, where the Government takes this decision. The criteria according to which concentrations are approved or rejected may therefore differ from the criteria used to analyse the effect on competition and its potential efficiency. In an interview published in the Spanish press recently, Commissioner Monti emphasised the pressure that Governments apply in competition cases. It is not hard to guess what the position of these Governments would be if they were the ones taking the decision."@en1

Named graphs describing this resource:

1http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/rdf/English.ttl.gz
2http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/rdf/Events_and_structure.ttl.gz
3http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/rdf/spokenAs.ttl.gz

The resource appears as object in 2 triples

Context graph