Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2002-04-09-Speech-2-140"

PredicateValue (sorted: default)
rdf:type
dcterms:Date
dcterms:Is Part Of
dcterms:Language
lpv:document identification number
"en.20020409.7.2-140"2
lpv:hasSubsequent
lpv:speaker
lpv:translated text
". Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, I would like firstly to express my enormous personal satisfaction and that of the Spanish Government at this first appearance, as has been highlighted by the President, which, furthermore, if you will allow me, is for me a re-acquaintance with the parliamentary world. I had the honour of presiding over the Spanish Parliament – the Spanish during the last legislature as President of Congress and my true and definitive political vocation is a parliamentary one. Therefore the fourth principle is the principle of complementarity, so that, by appropriately combining the structures of the Atlantic Alliance with those of the European Union, we can maintain those principles, which common sense suggests are absolutely essential in order that there be no duplication or redundancy of structures, planning or expenditure. At the end of the day investments in defence are like the two sides of the same coin, as in the case of our common currency. Please allow me now to refer, before listing the objectives of the Spanish Presidency, to the slogan chosen by this Presidency for this six-month period: as you know, ‘more Europe’, which applies both internally and externally. More Europe internally means, in terms of the European security and defence policy, that the European citizens should acquire a greater awareness of the need for a common foreign and security policy. More Europe externally means no more and no less than confronting an essential need. Ladies and gentlemen, please believe me that I am expressing not only a personal opinion but also that of the Spanish Government when I say that the European security and defence policy is an essential need for the European Union. If Europe wants to have a united presence in the world it is essential that it has a common security and defence policy. The European Union cannot have credibility in the world without having its own united voice in the field of security and without that voice being accompanied and supported by military capabilities. We have had the opportunity to witness this shortcoming. I also believe, ladies and gentlemen, that neither is it feasible in the long term to have a common monetary policy if there is no European common foreign and security policy to support that currency. As I said earlier, Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, we can group the objectives for these six months of the Spanish Presidency into the following three areas: operative or operational objectives, institutional objectives and objectives relating to public opinion. Beginning with the operative objectives, which are clearly the most technical, I must tell Parliament that they were the main focus of the informal meeting I held with the my colleagues, the Defence Ministers of the Union, on 22 and 23 March in Zaragoza. We have all decided to make the Headline Goal and its military capabilities our main priority. And in this respect I must firstly point out that we are working on determining the immediate response elements for the possible carrying out of the Petersberg tasks agreed in Helsinki. This need to determine the elements for immediate response also stems from the recently proven need to choose certain capabilities for the Headline Goal – its catalogue – so that there may be procedures to allow it to be mobilised immediately in the event of crisis. We have not simply tried to construct a mini Headline Goal, nor to create a parallel Headline Goal, but to determine the procedures for selecting capabilities that would be available in the initial moments in order to confront a crisis more rapidly. Secondly, we are promoting progress in the designation of a general operational headquarters. To put it clearly, with the informality which is normal in a parliamentary debate, the Laeken Declaration on Operational Capability does not for the moment tell us where the general operational headquarters to lead a force commissioned to carry out a Petersberg task in a situation of crisis would be. We still do not know, but neither do we know what the elements of that force which would have to be deployed in the initial moments would be. Therefore, these two objectives are essential to making the Declaration on Operational Capability effective. There are sufficient offers of general headquarters to determine what the immediate future of those general headquarters may be. We need to ensure – and we have established the requirements – the corresponding multinationality of its structures and the harmonisation of its procedures and operation. The Presidency will continue to promote lines of action for the work on this issue: developing normalised operational procedures which will govern the operation of future general headquarters and, secondly, also participating in the general headquarters panel which has been created within the European Action Plan that I will now refer to. In fact, Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, the Laeken Council approved a Belgian proposal, sponsored by the Netherlands, for an action plan for European military capabilities. It is simply the working method for indicating the shortcomings of our catalogue and for providing the means to resolve that lack of capability. By mobilising the Chiefs of Defence Staff of each of the Member States, the Spanish Presidency sought to determine what they saw as the most significant shortcomings in capability in the catalogue. An answer was given in record time and seventeen panels of experts have been created and are now operating, and they are working on analysing solutions for the twenty-three priorities or shortcomings considered the most important. For our part, we are making a cooperative effort to head four of these panels, which, by way of example, relate to attack helicopters, in-flight refuelling, air carrier capability and field hospitals. We are also participating in eight other panels. In Zaragoza, we held a preliminary exchange of views on the direction to take for the provision and funding of the new capabilities that are necessary as a result of the studies under way and original ideas for common funding have been put on the table, which we are studying and which perhaps I will also be able to explain in detail later on. Furthermore, and in accordance with the permanent objective of transparency in our actions with regard to the Atlantic Alliance, the European Union group of experts known as the Headline Task Force is already operating and carrying out studies and is meeting frequently during our Presidency together with NATO experts, who will continue to support this process with full cooperation and transparency with the work of the Atlantic Alliance in order to develop its defence capability initiative. In this field I must also mention the need for us to create a mechanism for developing capabilities which can clearly indicate at any time our situation in terms of European capabilities or lack thereof. It must naturally be an autonomous European Union mechanism but at the same time, for our own benefit, it must draw on the positive experiences of the Atlantic Alliance. There is no doubt that the greatest difficulty lies in the relationship with planning procedures of the Alliance forces in aspects such as the appropriate form and the tasks of the group of capabilities. Consequently, it has also been an honour for me to have the opportunity to receive the Chairmen of the Defence Committees of the Parliaments of the fifteen countries of Europe, together with the representatives of the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the WEU, in order to deal, quite rightly, with the objectives of the Spanish Presidency of the Union during this six-month period, which I also explained in this Parliament’s Committee on External Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy on 18 February. That no doubt brings us to an important, if not decisive, aspect, not just of our Presidency, but of the development of the European security and defence policy, which is the relationship between the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance, the development of the so-called Berlin Plus agreement, particularly in the chapter relating to the permanent access of the European Union during crisis management processes to NATO’s capabilities. The Barcelona European Council stressed the importance of reaching and concluding permanent agreements between the European Union and NATO as soon as possible and has charged the Presidency and the Secretary-General, the High Representative, with making the necessary high-level contacts in order to make the negotiations a success. Our Heads of State and Government have simply stated that we cannot go on delaying the creation of a permanent framework for cooperation with NATO and that or case-by-case solutions could lead to situations of stalemate similar to those we have already seen and would harm the Union at the least appropriate time, at the point of implementing, for the first time, a crisis management operation, seriously jeopardising its present and future prestige. Mr President, I will leave, in case there is greater interest on the part of the honourable Members, the examination of the assumption by the European Union of the leadership of certain missions, both in relation to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the continuation of the Amber Fox operation, and the assumption of certain responsibilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it remains for me in this field to mention the importance of the CME 02 exercise, which will test our capacity for organisation by means of crisis management procedures in May. It is going to take place during the Spanish Presidency and I can guarantee, ladies and gentlemen, that the difficulties which initially seemed insoluble are being overcome and also confirm to you that we will carry out this exercise not only on the date set but – I am sure – with success, giving an appropriate role to the various European Union institutions, such as the Military Committee, the Political and Security Committee, the Secretary-General, the High Representative, and the Chiefs of Staff. I referred to a second area, Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, which is the institutional field. In this regard I must point out that Spain, together with certain other countries, has promoted the need to create and formalise a Council of Defence Ministers. Please understand, ladies and gentlemen, that this is not just a question of adding another Council to the European institutional galaxy; it is simply a question of those of us who hold this responsibility being able to fulfil it, being able to work. We neither want to replace nor interfere with the competences of the Foreign Ministers; we simply want to do our work, to be able to deal with the problems I have referred to: the effectiveness of the Headline Goal and the possible deployment of Petersberg tasks. To this end, the Council is of essential importance. We have taken a first big step, because it has enjoyed full consensus, which is the meeting, under the umbrella of the General Affairs Council, of the Council of Defence Ministers, consisting solely of Defence Ministers, during May in Brussels. Secondly, and within the institutional objectives, I will move on to discussing the bases for a European arms policy, which will also provide an answer to the questions and concerns of Mr Brok. In reality, although very briefly mentioned in the Helsinki declaration, there had so far been no attempt to implement – or at least to establish the bases, to pave the way to – a European arms policy. And we wanted to take this step in a decisive manner. It is in no way a question of interfering with the European arms industry, which would not fall within our competence, but it is a question of setting the bases, the elemental principles, of a European arms policy. Earlier I said that the European security and defence policy is absolutely essential to the Union, and an arms policy is also essential to any defence policy. We have therefore prepared a kind of decalogue – the number of principles is of minimal importance at the end of the day – which achieves consensus on the broad principles that would govern a European arms policy. This list is based on the notion that the European arms industry must be at the service of the CFSP and not the other way round – which may seem an obvious principle, but in reality quite the opposite is usually true – and that it must be based on the principles of voluntarism, transparency and coordination with other organisations. Amongst the concrete measures envisaged we also incorporate the harmonisation of operative requirements, the common use of capabilities, the possible acquisition of those capabilities via a European arms agency, which unifies or at least coordinates the existing ones, the study of an accounting system more suited to reality, which facilitates the long-term funding of certain systems and also the search – as I said before – for new common funding formulas. The need to define a methodology to deal in the medium and long term with the lack of capability identified in the Helsinki catalogue brings us to these principles of a European arms policy, which will be examined by the national arms directors of the various countries at a meeting organised by the Presidency for 29 April. Finally, Mr President, I am coming to the end of the time available to me and, in trying to sum up aspects which are no less important but which are clearly not the essential priority, the operational aspects, please allow me to refer, in the seconds remaining to me, to those aspects which relate to the creation of an awareness of European defence amongst public opinion and to aspects connected to that awareness. Ladies and gentlemen, we have witnessed events which require us to construct a legal of humanitarian law for Petersberg tasks in the future. When Spain made this proposal the events of 11 September had not yet taken place. After 11 September, some months afterwards, certain events have demonstrated that it is absolutely essential for us to clarify the law applicable to crisis situations. I am clearly referring to the treatment given to prisoners, the treatment of the civil population, the treatment of private property and the relationship with civil authorities in the implementation of these tasks. We thought that this could be a road which starts in Salamanca, European Capital of Culture during these months, where many years ago, in the sixteenth century, the and the were born, and to that end we have also called a meeting in Salamanca in May, to which the representatives of all the countries of the Union and also third countries are of course invited, as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross. Finally, Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, the Spanish Presidency could not ignore the Mediterranean dimension of the CFSP. As you know, a meeting has been scheduled for 22 and 23 April in Valencia, which is very timely. We did not want the CFSP to be left out of this Mediterranean dimension and, to that end, we have also scheduled a seminar in Barcelona for 20 and 21 April on the Mediterranean dimension within our common security and defence policy. It is simply a question of letting the southern Mediterranean countries know that the Headline Goal is not a threat, even less against them: it is a question of establishing stable contacts with their armed forces, with their governments, which enrich the Mediterranean as an area of security and prosperity. And finally, also with this objective, there will be a meeting in Cartagena, following a Belgian initiative, of the people responsible for public opinion within the various defence departments, together with specialists from various media, in order to give new impetus to the understanding and communication of our message to the European citizens. If I may be allowed to abuse your patience, Mr President, I would like to make a final brief comment, which I believe to be important, on terrorism. Ladies and gentlemen, I have already pointed out that the Spanish Presidency – and President Aznar was able to say this in this House – treats the fight against terrorism as its main priority. In these circumstances, there is no need to stress why Spain is morally obliged to place the fight against terrorism at the forefront of its Presidency. I would like to start by describing the form my speech will take: I would firstly like to briefly point out the precedents and principles which inspire the European security and defence policy and then move on to an analysis of the objectives of the Spanish Presidency in the three areas into which these objectives have been grouped. The operational dimension, the institutional dimension, and equally importantly, the dimension relating to all the issues of concern to public opinion, both national and European. We have given the subject much consideration together with our defence colleagues in the European Union and we agree that the fight against terrorism should not fall within the Petersberg tasks, as I previously anticipated. We also agree that the fight against internal terrorism in the Union should correspond to the Rule of Law by means of its normal procedures, by means of courts of law and State security forces, but we could not remain passive in terms of the defence of our citizens in the face of possible terrorist attacks from outside the Union, which would undoubtedly require these common military capabilities we are trying to create. I am referring to our capabilities to tackle arms of mass destruction, NBC – nuclear, bacteriological or chemical – and also to our intelligence capabilities, the ability of our forces to protect themselves during missions and, finally, our capability to protect what has come to be known as the common space or European single sky. These capabilities, these tasks, make up the considerations and the basic approaches of a document being prepared by the Spanish Presidency to submit to the Seville European Council, where we hope it will be approved and for which we would also like the support, as for everything I have mentioned, of this Parliament. Thank you very much, Mr President. To start with the precedents, I must point out that our real mandate, following the Saint-Malo meeting, started in December 1999 in Helsinki when it was decided to create a European rapid reaction force, which would consist of at least 60 000 troops deployable within two months and for at least one year and including logistical support and air, sea and land resources for carrying out the missions we have christened ‘Petersberg tasks’, in a reference to the famous palace near Bonn where they were analysed, and which are basically the maintenance or enforcement of peace and rescue and humanitarian missions, which will have to be created by 2003. Therefore, since the beginning of 2000, in just two years, we have largely been able to implement this main objective in such a way that, following the Portuguese and French Presidencies, bodies were created which were initially transitional and which are now permanent, and a catalogue of military capabilities has been created, which has since been updated and to which the contributions of six aspiring countries have been incorporated and which was revised by the previous Belgian Presidency, whose work I am grateful for. The military objective slowed down somewhat during the Swedish Presidency, although that Presidency did make good use of its time to develop civil crisis procedures and management bodies. As you know, the Laeken European Council declared this rapid reaction force operable, but I must say frankly that this operability is for the moment more virtual than real, and this means that the Spanish Presidency’s mandate is even more urgent following the events of 11 September. I would now like to briefly indicate the principles and firstly point out, as this House knows very well, the intergovernmental nature of the area we are dealing with from which, furthermore, stems the principle of voluntarism, the direct link to the European Council and the organisation of this area, which includes the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General, who will subsequently have the opportunity to speak to this House concerning another area, the PSC, the Military Committee and the European Military Staff. The second principle is that of mission speciality. Ladies and gentlemen, I believe that this principle of speciality must be understood as a principle of evaluation, and I therefore repeat that we are talking exclusively about military missions for the carrying out of Petersberg tasks, humanitarian peace enforcement or peacekeeping missions, or rescue missions. Hence one of the difficulties, Mr President, in including the contribution of European military capabilities to defending against external terrorism, when necessary, which is connected to the main priority of the Spanish Presidency, which is the fight against terrorism and which, nevertheless, in the current state of development of our missions as a result of the principle of evaluation, we cannot undertake without a prior Council declaration which I will refer to later if there is time. The third principle is that of subsidiarity, obviously not in the traditional sense understood by this House and by all European law, the former Community law, but simply in the sense that our tasks as Europeans in the Europe of the security and defence policy are subsidiary to national defence, which corresponds – since it still forms part of that core, previously a hard core, of sovereignty – to national governments. It is undoubtedly also subsidiary to collective defence, which for the majority of the countries of the Union is attributed to the Atlantic Alliance, so that our missions, in turn, are in this respect subsidiary to the collective defence which falls to the Atlantic Alliance, but are no less autonomous for that."@en1
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata
"ius ad bellum"1
"ius in bello"1

Named graphs describing this resource:

1http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/rdf/English.ttl.gz
2http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/rdf/Events_and_structure.ttl.gz

The resource appears as object in 2 triples

Context graph