Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-12-11-Speech-2-158"
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"en.20011211.9.2-158"2
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Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, the Commission attaches high priority to the fight against fraudulent misuse of the financial resources of the European Union. The Commission is well aware of the fact that the European Parliament is our staunchest ally in this cause. Today the college of Commissioners has unanimously approved the Green Book I presented on the use of criminal law to protect the financial interests of the Community and on the creation of a European Public Prosecutor. By adopting this Green Paper just before the European Council meeting in Laeken, the Commission has sent out a strong political signal.
The originality of the proposal lies in the fact that the European Public Prosecutor would be a central authority responsible for conducting and co-ordinating criminal investigations and prosecutions at the European level, whereas the Office of the European Public Prosecutor itself would not be centralised, and the principle of mutual recognition would be paramount when it came to taking specific measures. A common investigation and prosecution area would thus be created in Europe for the protection of the Communities’ financial interests.
Once investigations were completed, the European Public Prosecutor would prefer charges before the proper national court in the relevant Member State. The proceedings themselves, including the delivery of a judgment, would then be governed by national law. The Commission proposes a decentralised structure for the Office of the European Public Prosecutor. In the Member States, the European Public Prosecutor would be assisted by ‘delegated national prosecutors’ whose responsibilities would have a European dimension.
As for proceedings, the European Public Prosecutor should be able to draw on the broad range of national investigation instruments. European prosecutors should therefore be able to enlist the help of the national and regional prosecuting authorities, such as the criminal investigation departments of the national police forces. The application of the principle of mutual recognition should also ensure that these investigative measures are automatically admissible throughout the territory of the Community. The same applies to the recognition of evidence and to judicial scrutiny of the actions of the European Public Prosecutor.
For example, if an application made in a Member State for a search or telephone-surveillance warrant is granted by a national court under the applicable national law, the warrant would be valid throughout the territory of the Community. This approach respects the national legal system. At the same time, the principle of mutual recognition would ensure that the common investigation area became a reality.
As far as judicial scrutiny of the European Public Prosecutor’s actions is concerned, the Commission also takes the view that national legal channels are adequate for this purpose and sees no compelling need for a European criminal court. Moreover, the Commission does not believe that the definition of the crimes for which the European Public Prosecutor could prefer charges implies the need to create an autonomous European penal code. What we do propose is the minimum essential degree of harmonisation, which should certainly go beyond the level that is set in the proposed directive for the protection of the Community’s financial interests and should therefore cover a wider catalogue of crimes than is covered by the 1995 Convention. We want to incorporate all offences that damage the financial interests of the Community, such as fraudulent practices in connection with tendering procedures or breaches of official secrecy to the detriment of Community interests.
We also consider uniform rules necessary for sentencing and prescription limits. The Green Paper, then, is structured in strict accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality while guaranteeing that a European Public Prosecutor will be able to operate efficiently and effectively. It is my view that we have struck a good balance which might even win over some sceptics.
The concept of a European Public Prosecutor fits neatly into the vision of a common European legal area. I compiled the Green Paper in close cooperation with Commissioner Vitorino. The various departments of OLAF were also in constant touch with their counterparts in the Directorate-General headed by Mr Vitorino during the drafting process. The new and long-awaited breakthroughs that have been made in judicial cooperation between Member States in criminal matters represent a sound basis for the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor. One of these is the European arrest warrant, which we hope the European Council will approve in Laeken. Another is Eurojust. The Eurojust initiative is not in competition with the European Public Prosecutor either. The two, in fact, would complement each other very well.
I expect the Green Paper to herald the start of a broad and objective discussion about the creation of a European Public Prosecutor with all interested parties, including, of course, practitioners, judges and prosecutors in the Member States. I would ask the European Parliament, as the driving force behind this idea, to play an active part in this discussion and to foster the debate in the Member States. We need the widest possible feedback on our proposal.
Once we have analysed the results of the consultation process, our aim is to be able to contribute something at the end of 2002 or the beginning of 2003 to the convention responsible for preparing the next intergovernmental conference. The ultimate goal is to ensure that the European Public Prosecutor is enshrined in the Treaties when they are next revised. We must be prepared for a long haul. I am, however, optimistic, because this goal can be achieved together, with the support of the European Parliament.
We have already made some headway in the fight against fraud. This applies especially to our cooperation with the Member States. The Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) is doing sterling work in this domain. The Commission has also been doing a great deal in the field of prevention; for example, OLAF will examine all future legislative proposals to ascertain whether they are fully fraud-resistant. On the other hand, there are still many serious shortcomings to be rectified in the body of criminal law with which the European Union seeks to combat fraud.
We need a consistent approach to criminal prosecution throughout Europe. The prosecution of cross-border frauds involving funds from the Community budget all too frequently grinds to a halt at the borders between different legal systems, of which there are not only 15 but 17 in the European Union, a number that will increase still further with enlargement.
What is lacking is an effective instrument with which administrative scrutiny by OLAF and national investigations can be made to culminate in criminal prosecution rather than running into the brick walls that divide our legal systems. For this reason, back in September 2000, the Commission tabled a proposal for the Intergovernmental Conference in Nice that a European Public Prosecutor be established to protect the financial interests of the Communities through the system of criminal law. The introduction of a European fiscal prosecutor would be unprecedented in qualitative terms, and a truly innovative step in the judicial fight against fraud.
The Heads of State and Government, sadly, did not pursue this proposal at the time. The issue, however, is far too important to be left on the shelf to gather dust. For this reason, I immediately decided to draw up a Green Paper which would spell out the details of the proposal for a European Public Prosecutor as well as indicating how this Public Prosecutor could operate in practice. The best possible use should therefore be made of the time between now and the next reform of the Treaties to respond to the questions and scepticism from the Member States, which have been asking us repeatedly about the precise form that such a system would take.
The EC Treaty would merely deal with the appointment, the dismissal and the responsibilities of the European Public Prosecutor and the main elements of his or her job specification. All other details, such as the status and working methods of the Public Prosecutor, would be laid down in secondary legislation. These are precisely the questions that are now addressed in the Green Paper.
How and on whose initiative does the Public Prosecutor act? What are his or her powers? Who supervises the actions of the Public Prosecutor? How does he or she cooperate with the national prosecuting agencies? What is the Prosecutor’s legal status, and how is the Office of the European Public Prosecutor to be organised?
On these questions, the Green Paper advances various options for discussion. The Commission, however, also clearly expresses its preferences, which, taken together, form a coherent system. What is the general approach that the Commission is proposing? Which principles underlie the Green Paper? The general approach proposed by the Commission is that the European Union should legislate only where such legislation is absolutely necessary and should rely as far as possible on the national laws and legal systems to regulate other matters.
Our proposals are therefore fully consistent with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. The European Public Prosecutor would considerably enhance the effectiveness of criminal law as an instrument in the fight against fraud without turning the national judicial systems upside down. What does that mean in detail?"@en1
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