Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-11-14-Speech-3-228"
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"en.20011114.10.3-228"2
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". – Mr President, my colleague, Mr Monti, has asked me to pass on his regrets to Parliament for his absence and to respond on his behalf. I should like, on Mr Monti's behalf, to thank Mrs Riis-Jørgensen for her hard work and considerable input into this report. We are extremely grateful for the rapid handling of this file by Parliament. I also wish to take this opportunity to explain to Parliament the Commission's position on this report.
The second point relates to information provided to Member States and third parties through Member States, that is, the removal of the name and address of the applicant shipyard and prospective purchaser. That is the intention of the amendments put forward.
The information that has been specified in Article (2)(a) of the Commission's proposal is the minimum necessary to allow third parties to submit useful comments to the Commission and to ensure the effectiveness of the transparency procedure. The purpose of that provision is to speed up the procedure. The alternative option would be to open the formal investigation procedure in all cases where the Commission has doubts about the compatibility of aid. That would entail the full publication of detailed information relating to the notification.
Thirdly, there is the extension of the expiry date until 31 December 2003. It has been argued by some Members of Parliament that the expiry date of the mechanism is too early. But by the end of 2002 we will have a good idea of how the WTO action is proceeding. It would be a timely opportunity to take stock of the situation and to reassess whether special measures for shipbuilding are still considered necessary.
The Commission can, at that stage, propose an extension of the defensive mechanisms to the Council.
In addition to what I have just said on behalf of my colleague Mr Monti, I should like to reply more specifically to two or three questions that were put to the Commission just now.
Firstly, Mr Blokland claims that there is a need for structural changes and not for more aid to ailing industries. I would agree with him that ideally subsidies should support structural change. Let us hope that in this case that is true.
Various Members have raised the issue of compatibility with the WTO. In the Commission's view the proposal on a temporary defensive mechanism is fully compatible with WTO law subsidies, provided they are not prohibitive, are not drawn to cause so-called adverse effects and are legitimate national policy instruments as far as the WTO is concerned. Therefore the European Community has the right to grant aid to its shipbuilders. In fact the EC has been granting such aid to its shipbuilding industry for many years, up to 31 December 2000. Insofar as subsidies are not sanctions in the sense of the dispute settlement procedure, they are permitted policy measures. Therefore the recourse to dispute settlement can in no way be seen as limiting the normal rights and obligations of Members under the WTO agreements.
Lastly, in reply to Mrs Riis-Jørgensen's question, as to whether the Commission would submit a new proposal for the reasons explained, the Commission does not see any reason to modify the proposal. Therefore the Commission has no plans to put forward a new proposal.
The Commission is grateful for the support Parliament has so far shown for this proposal. For the reasons that I have outlined, the proposed amendments are not acceptable to the Commission. Nevertheless I very much hope that we can count on Parliament's continued support in this matter.
Ideally, there would be no need for the Commission to present this proposal. I stress that operating aid is a particularly distorting form of aid, because it provides no incentive to improve efficiency and delivers no benefit in terms of competitiveness of the yards by, for example, encouraging training or research development. Nor, indeed, does it help the environment. For those reasons and after many years of operating aid being granted to the shipbuilding industry, the Commission finally decided to prohibit it as from the end of last year.
However, to quote a well-known philosopher, we do not live in the best of all possible worlds. That being so, it is only right that the Community should take action against any unfair competitive practices, and it is within that context that the proposal for the temporary defensive mechanism should be seen.
This proposal is one part of a two-pronged strategy against Korean practices and is designed to support the Community's action against Korea in the WTO. It is an exceptional measure, and is only taken in the light of a situation which led one representative rightly to quote Cicero saying: ‘
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It is, as I say, an exceptional measure, whose purpose is to put pressure on Korea to bring it to the negotiating table with the Community and to force it to bring an end to its unfair commercial practices.
As far as the Commission is concerned, it is not in any way the beginning of a new, possibly open ended regime of operating aid. That emphatically is not the Commission's intention.
I note that the proposed amendments to the Commission's proposal relate to three main issues. Firstly, there is the scope of the mechanism. Secondly, there is the information to be made available to the Member States and also to third parties through Member States. Thirdly and finally, there is the matter of its duration. I should like to respond to these points in that order.
So, firstly, on the extension of the scope: the amendments proposed in the report would considerably widen the scope of the mechanism, which covers only those market segments that the Commission has identified, in its report on the trade barriers regulation, as having already been considerably injured by unfair Korean practices. The proposal strikes a balance between a high maximum aid ceiling of 14% on the one hand and limited eligibility on the other hand. It is therefore specifically designed to counter unfair Korean practices. Any enlargement of the scope would risk changing the nature of the proposal.
I would like to draw Members' attention to Article 2(6) of the proposal, which provides that the Commission will keep under review the market segments eligible for aid in the light of evidence clearly proving that a specific market segment within the Community has been directly injured by unfair and opaque competitive conditions. The Commission will, accordingly, monitor the situation and keep Parliament informed of any potential review under that provision."@en1
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"Quo usque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra?"1
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