Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-11-14-Speech-3-201"
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"en.20011114.9.3-201"2
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".
Mr President, Minister, ladies and gentlemen, I do not have a great deal to add to what Mrs Durant has just said. I simply wish to confirm that the European Union has, for its part, always been strongly in favour of the compromise text, convinced that it is as important as the agreements on the non-proliferation of weapons, provided that these are accompanied by effective verification measures.
The Union is convinced that sending a negative signal on progress with international commitments on the non-proliferation of weapons would generally be damaging to world security.
As has been said, the compromise has not been accepted. It is, therefore, unlikely that a resolution will be produced before 19 November, but regular contacts are being maintained between the United States and the European Union on this matter. The United States take the view, furthermore, that the events of 11 September and those that have followed do not change their position on the verification protocol drawn up by the ad-hoc group.
On the other hand, for its part, the European Union maintains that this compromise text would have enabled a major breakthrough to be made at a particularly critical moment. The Union also takes the view that the dynamic of discussions in the ad-hoc group must be preserved, even if the form and the procedure have to be adapted to circumstances.
The United States is in the process of drafting new proposals for protection measures against the risk of a biological attack, insisting on the need to defend itself against the risk of terrorism. The European Union considers that some of the United States’ proposals are to be welcomed. Nevertheless, it also wishes to add others that are intended to improve the Convention and to encourage the development in the longer term of an instrument that is truly binding under law, but that is the very nub of the problem.
The Union will also be proposing a mechanism that will enable us to pursue regular dialogue on the Convention and will open this up to all parties concerned. These measures will certainly be part of the discussions at the Fifth Review Conference.
In conclusion, and as has already been said, one thing is certain and that is that there will be no protocol verifying the biological weapons convention in the short term. We are seeking to uphold the achievements of the ad-hoc working group. Consultation is taking place on a regular basis with the United States and we are trying, on the basis of their proposals, to complement them with our own, so as to preserve the spirit of open and regular dialogue with all parties to the Convention. This, in our view, is the key to multilateralism."@en1
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