Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-10-22-Speech-1-044"
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"en.20011022.4.1-044"2
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"In this spirit, we organised a meeting with our American counterparts, which is to be held on 6 and 7 November 2001, to set up a working group that brings together the American authorities and the Commission with a view to coordinating efforts so that the highest possible level of security is ensured, whilst avoiding a situation where airline companies are subjected to excessive measures.
As a general rule, to use nuclear materials for the purposes of terrorism, perpetrators require, beyond simply holding the nuclear materials, the technical capability to store, process and launch the materials, which would be very difficult to achieve without alerting the authorities.
Everything has been implemented at Community level, by applying Chapter VII of the Euratom Treaty, which requires a strict registration of nuclear materials in order to prevent them being used for non-peaceful purposes.
Nonetheless, the events in New York show that we must assess the vulnerability of nuclear installations. The Commission services are carrying out an evaluation, in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, particularly in terms of security at nuclear installations.
Our assessment should show how worthwhile it would be to publish the recommendations and to supplement existing legislation at Community and/or international level. In particular, we must assess the conventions established under the International Atomic Energy Agency, such as the convention on physical protection, which mainly covers the transportation of nuclear materials.
Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to thank you for your attention.
I shall now move on to the possible consequences of terrorist activities, such as those committed on 11 September 2001, had they been carried out on an industrial or power installation.
The nuclear industry is one of the sectors of industry that has the most stringent security and safety standards, particularly because of the requirements of non-proliferation and radiation protection.
We should also mention, however, that other installations, that are less well protected, may be vulnerable, and a fatal accident of considerable proportions could happen at one of these plants, whether they belong to the chemical industry, which was the case at Bhopal, Seveso and recently at Toulouse – or at other power installations, such as natural gas infrastructures, which are not without risks. Some of us still recall the time when hydroelectric dams burst.
Since 11 September, Member States’ authorities have strengthened existing protective systems and physical protection measures that were already in force for at-risk installations and more specifically for nuclear installations.
These physical protection measures are particularly for access control to the installations and include a ban on flying over the installations.
As far as the design of existing installations is concerned, it must be noted that the risks are taken into consideration, either wholly or according to the probability of an accident taking place. Therefore, the risk of a primary cooling system bursting, to which terrorists could have access, is taken wholly into account and a security system is put in place to avoid this risk.
Comparative assessments are carried out on other risks. This is what happens for seismic risks, which are taken into consideration in a number of ways, according to the geographical location of the installation itself.
In this respect, the Commission would like to reiterate that the design and construction of electro-nuclear power stations fall within the sole competence of Member States. In addition to conventional nuclear installations, however, we must also take into account the risks related to transporting nuclear materials. In reality, the transportation of highly radioactive materials is only a very small part of activities involving nuclear materials and is carried out in accordance with the most stringent provisions of international and national regulations."@en1
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