Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-10-02-Speech-2-109"

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"en.20011002.5.2-109"2
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"Mr President, first of all I should like to congratulate Mr Titley on his very sound and constructive report. His efforts, as well as useful contributions by other fellow MEPs, have enabled this Parliament to reach more or less consensus on an otherwise very sensitive issue: the control of the arms trade. In light of the attacks in America, there is growing awareness of the fact that the vast distribution of arms worldwide leads to unstable countries which form the breeding ground for terrorism. The Titley report rightly points out that the 1998 EU Code is a major step forward towards a more coherent and transparent European policy on arms exports. At the same time, however, a number of shortcomings and flaws have been flagged, five of which I should like mention. First of all, the annual reports of the Member States are not harmonised. Some countries, including Great Britain and Ireland, give a detailed account of the permits issued and of the amount and value of exported arms. Other countries, such as Austria and Greece, give no information whatsoever about the licences issued. In that way, an efficient, effective assessment is, of course, difficult. The annual report would, therefore, need to meet a number of standards. Each permit issued should be accompanied by a detailed description of the material, the addressee and end user. For permits refused, the reason for refusal should be explained in more detail. Secondly, in my opinion, the monitoring procedures concerning the end user of the exported arms should be stepped up. In Africa, Togo and Burkina Faso are officially the end users of arms supplied from Bulgaria, whilst in reality, these are passed on to Liberia and the rebels of Sierra Leone. Embassies of EU Member States could play a more supervisory role . Penal measures should also be introduced for transit countries that violate arms embargos. Thirdly, I am of the opinion that tighter controls should be in place for the production of military equipment under licence abroad by EU companies or in the framework of industrial joint venture agreements. It is not acceptable for a certain country to be refused a licence for weapons and for arms manufacturers to be able to circumvent that ban by supplying arms components which are then assembled on site. A fourth shortcoming is that there is no control whatsoever on private arms dealers, the number of which is rising all the time since the end of the cold war. Of the five hundred million light arms in circulation worldwide, forty to sixty percent of these are illegal, according to the UN. A final serious shortcoming of the EU Code of Conduct is that it is not legally binding. At the moment, it is a no-strings-attached gentlemen’s agreement. Sanctions cannot be imposed on those who breach the Code. Finally, I should like to express the hope that the EU Code of Conduct will form the basis for a worldwide code on the export of arms. It makes no sense whatsoever for Europe to be committed to controlling the arms trade, while China and Russia continue to export weapons to crisis areas without any restrictions. In that sense, the UN Conference in July was a missed opportunity, and I believe that this topic must remain a permanent feature in the transatlantic dialogue."@en1
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