Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-09-05-Speech-3-403"
| Predicate | Value (sorted: default) |
|---|---|
| rdf:type | |
| dcterms:Date | |
| dcterms:Is Part Of | |
| dcterms:Language | |
| lpv:document identification number |
"en.20010905.12.3-403"2
|
| lpv:hasSubsequent | |
| lpv:speaker | |
| lpv:translated text |
".
Mr President, I am glad that, in the report drawn up by Mr Evans, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs emphasises the importance of reform as a means of ensuring effective implementation of the rules on competition in an enlarged Community. I would like to thank Mr Evans personally for his consideration for the Commission, his commitment in dealing with this issue and the high quality of his report. Next I would like to thank the European Parliament as a whole and all those who have spoken this evening for the support and encouragement Parliament has given the Commission during the debates on the White Paper and ever since. I must say our proposal for a regulation has greatly benefited from the comments, criticism and encouragement emanating from the committees and from this House.
On this specific problem I have taken note of the information Mr Evans and Mr Rovsing gave just now, designed to promote a compromise solution. For my part, I can assure you that if Amendment No 10 is rejected, the Commission will cease to regard evidence contained in such documents as an aggravating circumstance in determining financial sanctions. In that eventuality, I can give an assurance to propose the following form of words to the Commission: ‘in determining what financial sanction to impose on a company in future cases, the Commission will not regard as an aggravating circumstance, under the guidelines for calculating fines imposed in implementation of Article 15(2) of Regulation 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty, the existence of texts demonstrating that the company’s in-house lawyers have alerted the directors to the unlawfulness of conduct covered by the Commission’s decision’.
I hope that this assurance can represent common ground between the Commission and those seeking to extend the duty of secrecy to in-house lawyers.
The Evans report rightly stresses the importance of legal certainty for companies. The rules and their scope must be sufficiently predictable.
A wider application of Community competition rules by the relevant authorities in the context of a network of close cooperation will, in itself, represent a great step forward in ensuring predictability as compared with the present situation, in which sixteen competition authorities apply different rules.
The Commission recognises that under certain circumstances there may be a legitimate requirement for clarification in relation to an individual case, and that the guidelines, guiding principles and existing case law do not always provide answers. However, it is essential to avoid any rules that might lead to the reintroduction of the notification system.
The amendment proposed to Article 10 raises concerns in this respect. By way of supplement and clarification, it states that the Commission can decide that there is no violation of Articles 81 and 82, in particular whenever the agreements involve financial risk or considerable investment of capital. This amendment would only be acceptable if the Commission was not in practice compelled to decide that there was no violation in all cases involving substantial investment.
The Commission believes the best way to ensure predictability in individual cases is to introduce a new instrument: the adoption of opinions. The Commission has already undertaken to introduce such a system, whereby it can issue reasoned written opinions in cases where there are gaps in the existing rules and decision-making procedures. The level of investment will also be one of the relevant criteria in deciding whether to issue an opinion or not. My impression is that the proposed system for formulating opinions would be favourably received by the business world.
On harmonisation of the procedures and sanctions, the Commission’s proposal is based on the traditional approach, which leaves the Member States able to determine the procedures and sanctions for implementing Community law.
I agree with the Evans report that it is desirable to have common procedures and sanctions but, like Rome, the Community was not built in a day. Our approach is to introduce a substantial framework first, leaving the possible introduction of common procedures and sanctions to a later stage. Once experience of operating the system has been acquired, it will be easier to identify the areas that give rise to practical problems and draw up rules to deal with them effectively.
The last point I want to mention, Mr President, relates to the national courts. I am persuaded that they will be fully capable of applying Community competition rules in their entirety, because they already play a fundamental role in implementing Community law. Nor should we forget that, to guarantee consistent implementation of the rules, the proposal provides, in particular, for the Commission, together with the national competition authorities, to be entitled to comment as
on proceedings pending before the courts. The proposed powers will allow the Commission to protect the public interest in the effective and consistent implementation of the rules, by drawing the attention of the courts to important points relating to their interpretation and implementation. As regards the independence of the courts, of course they will not be bound by the comments of the
and they will, in any case, be free to submit preliminary questions to the Court of Justice.
The central purpose of the reform is to create a more effective system of implementation, to the benefit of consumers, businesses and the European economy in general.
We are aware of the fact that the proposed reform may mean the courts have to acquire new powers. The implementation of the competition rules can indeed be a complex matter. I therefore agree entirely with Mr Evans that the question of training judges requires careful consideration. The Commission can contribute in substance, providing material and human resources. We are also looking at the possibility of cooperating with the national authorities in this matter and providing finance from existing training programmes.
I conclude, Mr President, by expressing sincere and heartfelt thanks to the European Parliament for travelling a common road with us through this very complicated terrain, which is, however, as various speakers this evening have sought to highlight, of such vital interest to the economy and indeed to our individual citizens whom you represent.
Abolishing the current system of notification and authorisation and the exclusive power of the Commission under Article 81(3) means the Commission and the national competition authorities will be able to concentrate their efforts on combating the worst infringements.
The establishment of a network of authorities for the protection of competition will allow us to coordinate our efforts and use our respective resources to best effect. The essential premise for the success of such cooperation is for all the competition authorities to apply the Community rules more widely, otherwise the planned network would just be an empty framework. This is essential if we want to create uniform competitive conditions for common market businesses and prevent renationalisation of Community competition policy.
I keenly appreciate, therefore, the fact that Mr Evans fully and firmly supports the Commission’s proposal contained in Article 3, aimed at making Community competition law the only set of rules to be applied in cases where trade between Member States might be prejudiced.
This proposal has very wide implications and is meeting with resistance on the part of various Member States within the Council’s working group. However, I remain convinced of the solid logical foundation of the proposal and I can assure you that the Commission is determined to establish uniform conditions for agreements that might prejudice trade between Member States.
Mr President, I would now like to touch on some of the specific issues that have emerged, starting with professional secrecy. Effective implementation of the rules on competition is closely linked to the capacity of the Commission to obtain evidence on infringements. Our powers are closely linked to documentary evidence. We base a great deal of our work on on-site inspections, looking for documents which demonstrate the existence of cartels. Any change likely to reduce the effectiveness of our inspections would therefore have grave consequences on the possibility of implementing the rules on competition and on their effectiveness. That makes me extremely worried about the amendment to extend duty of secrecy to in-house lawyers.
I want to avoid any misunderstanding on one point, however: the Commission is perfectly aware of the positive role that in-house lawyers can play by counselling companies about observing the rules on competition. That role will assume greater importance under the new system, where companies will have to carry out more systematic self-assessment of their agreements in particular to establish compliance with the exemption conditions laid down by Article 81(3).
However, the question of duty of secrecy for in-house lawyers essentially arises in the context of inspections attempting to establish the existence of serious restrictions which fail to comply with the provisions of Article 81(3). In this context, the reform proposed by the Commission does not change the current situation at all. We have to recognise that, unlike external lawyers, in-house lawyers are employees of the company and take their orders from it. They are in a position of occupational dependence and may face a conflict of interest between loyalty towards their employers and respect for ethical standards. Furthermore, internal communications between a company lawyer and his employer are so numerous and indistinguishable from purely company advice – which differs from legal advice – that duty of secrecy for in-house lawyers could create conditions ripe for concealing documentary evidence. If the communications between in-house lawyers and other employees became confidential, the Commission’s powers to apply the standards would be seriously compromised."@en1
|
| lpv:unclassifiedMetadata |
Named graphs describing this resource:
The resource appears as object in 2 triples