Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-09-05-Speech-3-399"

Predicate	Value (sorted: default)
rdf:type	lpv_eu:Speech2
dcterms:Date	"2001-09-05"^^xsd:date2
dcterms:Is Part Of	lp_eu:Implementation of competition rules2
dcterms:Language	"it"^^xsd:language2
lpv:document identification number	"en.20010905.12.3-399"2
lpv:hasSubsequent	lp_eu:2001-09-05-Speech-3-4002
lpv:speaker	lp:Benedetto Della Vedova2
lpv:spokenAs	substitute; Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy (1999-07-22--2002-01-14)3 member; TGI (1999-07-20--2001-10-02)3 member; ECON (1999-07-21--2002-01-14)3 member; Delegation for relations with the Mashreq countries and the Gulf (1999-09-29--2002-01-14)3 unknown; Lista Emma Bonino (1999-07-20--2004-07-19)3
lpv:translated text	"Mr President, Commissioner, the Italian Radicals will vote for the report by Mr Evans, who has done an excellent job. I believe that the measures we are discussing represent a serious attempt to face up to an unavoidable problem – the risk that the Commission will end up overwhelmed by notifications – and I think it was both right and courageous to choose to base this reform on decentralisation to national authorities and courts. The alternative would have been to create a mammoth, over-bureaucratised structure in its directorate general, all the more so, of course, with the prospect of enlargement. Of course, only experience will tell us if we are heading into an incomprehensible mosaic or a situation that guarantees legal certainty and, I might say, unity of law within the single European market. I believe, however, that the attempt should be sustained, just as I believe there will be a very warm welcome for the abolition of mandatory notification and authorisation and the introduction of the exception rule, which seems to me a rather more liberal principle, especially in a sector – that of regulating authorities and competition – which is always running the risk of being a different, new instrument for state interference in market dynamics. This is certainly not the case of the Commission, but a number of authorities – I am thinking of certain central banks, for instance, which in fact preserve anti-trust powers over the credit market – run this risk in my opinion, and sometimes go even further. In conclusion, I believe, however, that strengthening the sanctioning and investigative powers of the Commission, which are in fact contained in the provision, Commissioner, requires suitable procedural and legal guarantees – this point is raised in Mr Evans’s justification – especially in a situation like Europe’s, in which the Commission accumulates the functions of both the investigator, one might say, and the judge, since we are not in a system in which the judge is a third party. Of course, there are appeals, decisions can be appealed against, but I believe that in this, in the guarantees for the parties involved in the proceedings, the greatest guarantees must be assured."@en1

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