Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-09-05-Speech-3-022"

Predicate	Value (sorted: default)
rdf:type	lpv_eu:Speech2
dcterms:Date	"2001-09-05"^^xsd:date2
dcterms:Is Part Of	lp_eu:”Echelon”2
dcterms:Language	"nl"^^xsd:language2
lpv:document identification number	"en.20010905.2.3-022"2
lpv:hasSubsequent	lp_eu:2001-09-05-Speech-3-0232
lpv:speaker	lp:Bas Belder2
lpv:spokenAs	member; EDD (1999-07-20--2004-07-19)3 unknown; Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij - Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond - Reformatorisch Politieke Federatie (1999-07-20--2002-03-17)3 member; Members from the European Parliament to the Joint Parliamentary Assembly of the Agreement between the African, Caribbean and Pacific States and the European Union (ACP-EU) (2000-10-05--2002-01-14)3 member; Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy (1999-07-21--2002-01-14)3 vice-chair; Delegation for relations with the United States (1999-07-22--2002-01-14)3 substitute; Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy (1999-07-21--2002-01-14)3
lpv:translated text	"Mr President, the Temporary Committee on ECHELON has resulted in a thorough investigation which is being backed virtually across the political spectrum, at least where its analysis is concerned. A sensitive issue, however, is the desire for more European cooperation in intelligence activities. It would have sufficed to state that cooperation in defence and security affairs gives the Member States a joint responsibility to protect privacy. The report cannot address all political considerations. Therefore, it would have been better not to include in the report any references to the desirability for closer cooperation. To date, moderate use has been made of the current capacity to exchange information. The protection of privacy is already problematic and the discrepancies between the Member States are considerable. The consistent exchange of information is therefore not very likely in the near future. The key reason for setting up the temporary committee was the fear of industrial espionage. There is no reason to doubt that military and security targets are the primary concern of the intelligence services. As might be expected with secret service activities, proof of actual industrial espionage by the US is absent. Neither do the findings substantiate the American accusation of European corruption. Restricted supervisory scope illustrates the importance of effective access to encryption. Although confidentiality typifies the very nature of the activities of intelligence services, more supervision is required. For example, Member States must monitor compliance with the mandate of the intelligence services, hence my amendment to protect communication against interception where supervision is lacking. By directing efforts to that aspect of interceptions, we can try to prevent their inappropriate use. This is one of the obligations of the Member States, pursuant to the European Convention on Human Rights and does not only apply in respect of their own citizens. Similarly, Member States may not allow their intelligence services abroad to act in contravention of privacy. Similar arrangements can also be sought in a larger context, not least with the US."@en1

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