Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-07-04-Speech-3-152"
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"en.20010704.3.3-152"2
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"The European Parliament’s report on the financial year 2000 of the ECB and that bank’s own Annual Report on the same subject attempt to iron out their differences of appraisal and present a united front on the eve of the physical changeover to euro coins and banknotes. As soon as we scratch the surface, however, we discover contradictions, which have extremely serious implications because they go back to certain faults in the construction of the single currency that will be very difficult to put right.
Let us begin, for example, with the institutional issues. The first difference concerns the powers of the Council of Ministers. The European Parliament’s report advocates the strengthening of economic policy coordination and stability programmes (paragraph 5 of the resolution), which would mean strengthening the Eurogroup and its means of action. The ECB report, however, emphasises that "the first two years of the euro have also shown that the policy-making framework at European level is satisfactory" (page 3). This makes it clear that the Bank is fiercely protective of its independence, knowing full well that the growing political pressure on the management of the single currency, within a monetary zone that is not optimal, risks leading to difficult conflicts. But is management by technocrats any better? To tell the truth, both systems are unworkable.
The second difference concerns transparency. The European Parliament’s report calls once again (paragraph 14) for the minutes of the ECB Governing Council meetings to be published, together with a summary of the stance of both the approving and dissenting parties. The ECB finds this proposal repugnant, for a very good reason that the European Parliament obstinately refuses to accept: in the specific case of the eurozone, made up of separate nations, conflicts between governors could easily be assimilated with conflicts between nations, which would do further damage to the already weak credibility of the euro. Once again, this brings us back to the non-optimal nature of the monetary zone of the Twelve.
The third difference concerns voting in the Governing Council. The ECB report upholds the "one member, one vote" principle, because the governors of the national central banks deliberate with entire personal independence and not as representatives of their country (page 181). The European Parliament’s report, for its part, takes note of the reform introduced by the Nice Treaty to Article 10 of the Statute of the ECB, which could make it possible, in future, to weight the votes in accordance with size of country (paragraph 17 of the resolution). That reform would suit the large countries, especially Germany, which is complaining of the ECB’s failure to act, implicitly blaming this on the disproportionate influence of the small countries within the Governing Council. However, this would be very difficult to carry through because it seems contrary to the spirit of Maastricht, to the ECB’s position and to the interests of the small countries, which would have something to say about it. Once again, the idea of a single currency for several nations is beset by contradictions."@en1
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