Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-07-03-Speech-2-045"
| Predicate | Value (sorted: default) |
|---|---|
| rdf:type | |
| dcterms:Date | |
| dcterms:Is Part Of | |
| dcterms:Language | |
| lpv:document identification number |
"en.20010703.2.2-045"2
|
| lpv:hasSubsequent | |
| lpv:speaker | |
| lpv:spokenAs | |
| lpv:translated text |
"Ladies and gentlemen, I would first like to thank my fellow Members for their cooperation during the discussions, and in particular Jimmy Provan for the very fair opinion that he has just presented here in plenary.
Nevertheless, I am going to stir things up a little. I say that quite simply because we should not forget that our amendments at second reading last December have been at the heart of this debate. We wanted to create a level playing field in Europe as regards company takeovers. It is quite clear that the result that emerged from the Conciliation Committee did not give us what we wanted. Parliament offered all kinds of compromises during the negotiations. Jimmy Provan has explained that a compromise was not reached because the Council rejected any kind of compromise, dug its heels in over the key issue in its common position, and was absolutely unwilling to budge a single millimetre. One of our offers for a compromise, one of the last that we made, was for a directive on the level playing field to come into force. This is, by the way, something we proposed some time ago, and which the Council, as I discovered last weekend, has had before it since 1972, that is to say much longer than the 12 years that have been mentioned here. The entry into force of the duty of neutrality is to be made conditional on such a level playing field directive coming into force. Even this, although it really seems quite self-evident, was rejected by the Council.
There was merely agreement with the idea of the Commission convening a group of experts to address this subject and then possibly develop some proposals. I would like to know what the logic is of convening a group of experts once the directive has already been adopted. Normally, you set up the group of experts first and then adopt a directive on the subject in question. I am not convinced at all by the procedure being adopted here.
I have therefore come to the conclusion that this is not so much a compromise as a capitulation by the majority of the Parliament delegation in the face of the Council's position. All this in the context of a number of important decisions going through the conciliation procedure. I have in mind, for example, the Directive on money-laundering , the whole subject of the Lamfalussy follow-up, and everything else in that area. I believe that if we agree to this directive, we are debasing the institutional role of this House, and for that reason alone we should not agree. Quite apart from that, there are any number of objective reasons why we cannot agree to it. The result of this directive will be that in future protected companies will be able to take over unprotected companies. That is the clear consequence of this. Because if we do not have a level playing field, if national legislation in certain Member States makes it permissible to protect companies by limitations on voting rights, by golden shares, by multiple voting rights, by a variety of means of intervention by the administration, and if this is in fact not the case in other Member States, then I would like to know where the level playing field is. Alternatively, let me draw a comparison between the United States and Europe. The Americans have gone in exactly the opposite direction. They have introduced a "business judgment rule" according to which company boards can protect themselves if they wish, whereas in Europe we forbid that. So what will the results of a decision of this kind be, if it is easier for American companies to take over European companies than the other way round? Furthermore, the trend in America also gives the lie to much of what we have been able to read in the papers this morning. The papers always maintain that things would degenerate into chaos or that it would have a negative impact on Europe's financial market if we suddenly rejected this directive. The American experience suggests the opposite, they have gone down exactly the opposite path, and no one could say that America's stock market is less dynamic than Europe's. So it is evident that these connections do not apply.
I would also like to remind you about the vital concept of location advantages. Delaware is a state that has relatively restrictive legislation on company takeovers. It is interesting to note that 40% of the companies quoted on the New York stock exchange are based in Delaware, rising to 60% of indexed companies. My question to you is: why should that be? I can only suggest that I believe these conditions to be a very important factor when companies make decisions about their location. No one has anything against protecting shareholders. I am a shareholder myself. So it goes without saying of course, as a matter of logic, that like most individuals who are shareholders, I am in favour of protecting shareholders, but on equal terms. The phrase used by Jimmy Provan, "one share – one vote", simply does not apply in Europe. That is the key problem. Because this phrase does not apply, it would be wrong at this stage to introduce strict neutrality which would ultimately lead to major imbalances in Europe and would thus probably harm the internal market more than benefit it. To sum up, the Swedish Prime Minister called the directive unique. I agree – in its present form, it is uniquely bad. That is why it must be rejected."@en1
|
Named graphs describing this resource:
The resource appears as object in 2 triples