Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-05-31-Speech-4-081"
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"en.20010531.3.4-081"2
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Yesterday, in this House, we saw a good example of one of the methods habitually used in European affairs to cover up problems and to avoid subjecting them to public opinion. In the debate on the Treaty of Nice, almost the only thing discussed was the ‘post-Nice’ situation. All the federalist speakers raised their heads above the parapet, one after the other, to urge the setting up, at the next Council in Laeken, under the Belgian Presidency (a presidency which, of course, is in favour of ultra-federalism), of a ‘convention’ which would open up a ‘constitutive process’ which was to produce a ‘European federal constitution’ which the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference would be called upon to adopt. Thus the ratification of the Treaty of Nice is regarded as a fait accompli
We are not even discussing it. The debate on 2004 has taken the place of the debate on Nice, and no doubt the debate on 2010 will only serve to cover up any debate on the future draft submitted for ratification in 2004.
The result, in the short term, is that practically nobody has talked about Nice, and public opinion is still just as ignorant, except in Ireland, where they are holding a referendum, about the content of a very important treaty which will be stealthily submitted for ratification by their national parliaments.
We published our alternative report on the Treaty of Nice to try to make sure that the debate in France avoids this legerdemain. In particular it must be emphasised absolutely that the Treaty of Nice as a whole is fundamentally opposed to the spirit and the letter of the French constitution, a spirit which is the spirit of national sovereignty.
Some provisions even contradict it openly. For example, there is the introduction of integration as an objective for the Union and the Community (Article 43 of the EU Treaty), the introduction of uniform regulations and conditions governing Members of the European Parliament (Article 190(5) of the EC Treaty), the creation of regulations governing political parties at European level (Article 191 of the EC Treaty), the appointing of the Commission by a qualified majority (Article 214(2) of the EC Treaty), the approval by a qualified majority of certain international agreements on common foreign and security policy (Article 24 of the EU Treaty), the new measures taken, by majority vote, to introduce the euro (Articles 111 and 123(4) of the EC Treaty), the transfer to Community level of international trade negotiations on services and intellectual property (Article 133 of the EC Treaty), the inclusion of the Community in responsibility for modernising social security (Article 137 of the EC Treaty), or the creation, in vague terms, of a rapid-response military force (Article 17 of the EU Treaty).
It is absurd, in these circumstances, that at present the French government is not even considering bringing the matter to the attention of the Constitutional Council."@en1
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