Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-05-30-Speech-3-185"
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"Mr President, I will speak on behalf of the Budgetary Control Committee and also on behalf of the Socialist Group. Luckily the two positions are the same on this report. I would like to begin by thanking Mr Dell'Alba for the excellent cooperation we have had on the Financial Regulation and all the colleagues that have worked with us in the different groups. Most groups showed a great willingness to compromise. I would like to thank, in particular, the Liberal, Green, and EDD Groups for their active support in drawing up a package of amendments that was acceptable to a majority of the Budgetary Control Committee.
I have been approached in recent weeks by a number of national governments asking us to proceed with our vote without delay. The sad fact in today's institutional set-up is that if Parliament wants its voice to be heard it must resort to unusual tactics. I support the case for speedy reform, but on an issue as important as this – financial rules which could with us for the next 21 years – we must refuse to let Parliament's legitimate expectations to negotiate be ignored by an arrogant Council.
I was surprised, like my colleague Mr Dell'Alba, that most amendments to this report were tabled by the chair of the Budgetary Control Committee. I agree with Mr Dell'Alba that, of course every Member is entitled to put down amendments to a report, also on behalf of their group. In the case of a committee chair, however, you have to wonder whether they are mixing up roles to the detriment of the standing of their committee.
These proposals today are the most sweeping changes to the Community's financial rules in 21 years. For the Budgetary Control Committee, the reform of financial control is the key aspect of this proposal. Under the Commission's proposal, the
visa issued by a Central Financial Controller will be abolished and instead Directorates-General will be made fully responsible for the lifecycle of expenditure for programmes carried out under their authority. This is one of the key reforms called for by the Committee of Independent Experts in 1999, when it issued its reports. The CIE concluded, at the time, that most of the irregularities highlighted by the committee stemmed from decisions to which financial control gave its approval – the committee also stated that the supposed quality guarantee provided by the visa is a myth. It gave two strong arguments for changing the system and I quote, "First
checking, whether it be universal or on the basis of sampling is unlikely to be a cost-effective process. The efforts put into checking all transactions is clearly disproportionate while sampling is unlikely to have sufficient dissuasive effect. The second and fundamental principle is that any retention of
control runs up against a crucial objection that
if not
it displaces responsibility for financial irregularity from the person actually managing expenditure onto the person approving it. This displacement of responsibility means, in effect, that no one is ultimately responsible.”
The Court of Auditors also discussed changes to the financial control regime in its Opinion No 4 of 1997. With respect to the abolition of the
visa it concluded as follows and I quote again, "As for completely abolishing the requirement of prior approval, this would not be any more acceptable unless it were to be replaced by other procedures that provided at least equivalent safeguards and that could involve financial officials other than the Financial Controller." Has this test been met? Broadly speaking, yes, at least according to Court Opinion No 2 of this year which commented on the Commission's proposal as follows: The provisions governing the financial actors and therefore the structure of the Community internal control system would represent an important step towards meeting the Court's recommendations.
The case for reform is overwhelming, that much is clear, but it is also to an extent a leap in the dark and it can only work if a number of conditions are met: first authorising officers must be held fully accountable; failure must be recognised and dealt with, not covered up.
The same interpreters refuse to translate into Dutch when I speak English, but I am happy to oblige.
Second, the disciplinary procedure must be strengthened. There has been too little action in the past. A financial regularities committee would strengthen the procedure as would other amendments we have introduced. Third, the independence of internal auditors must be guaranteed and so must the professional independence of those that carry out internal audit within the Directorates-General. Finally, minimum standards of financial controls must be adhered to. Amendment No 72 sets this out. In order for this provision to be effective, there is a need for a central official under the responsibility of the DG Budget to set minimum standards without undermining the responsibility of spending DGs.
We will have to negotiate with the Council on this proposal. The only possibility of doing so effectively is to postpone the vote on the legislative resolution under our rules of procedures. Discussion on Article 24 showed that the Council does not pay the slightest attention to Parliament's views, even though the President of the Budgets Committee is here today, and that is particularly surprising coming from the Swedish Presidency."@en1
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"(The President urged the speaker to speak more slowly to assist the interpreters)"1
"draftsman of the opinion of the Committee on Budgetary Control. –"1
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