Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-03-14-Speech-3-255"
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"en.20010314.9.3-255"2
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"To begin with I should like to answer some of the points that were raised this afternoon.
The Commission is grateful for the support Mrs Kauppi has given to the report of the Lamfalussy committee. There is no difference of opinion. She want speedier legislation. She is right. The Commission wants it, Mrs Randzio-Plath wants it, everybody wants it. She gave the example of USITs, which it look a long time to agree upon. Fortunately, agreement has now been reached but I would agree with Mrs Kauppi that it has taken a very long time.
Central to this whole discussion is the possibility of having a callback mechanism as Parliament has requested. I do not have to explain what it is; everybody knows.
The Commission firmly believes that we ought to find a solution within the Treaty – which means Articles 202 and 211 – and that we should stay within the confines of the comitology decision of June 1999. Therefore we cannot see our way to granting Parliament a callback possibility. Having said that, I would ask Parliament to remember what is on the table. Firstly, the Commission will take full account of a resolution approved by Parliament. Secondly, as Mr Cox said this afternoon, it is Parliament – and the Council – that decide on the scope of levels in implementing measures. If the directive contains broad principles and executive measures and Parliament does not agree that a certain executive measure should be called that and relegated to level 2, then Parliament should say so and amend the directive to say that a particular implementing measure should be elevated to the status of a general principle and therefore be dealt with under level 1. So it is in Parliament's own hands to decide on the distinction between general principles and executive measures. That is the second point.
Thirdly, if Parliament thought the Commission was abusing the system, what do you think would happen the next time the Commission made a proposal concerning a certain directive? Parliament would surely then be in a position to say "Look, you fooled us the last time, now we are going to be extremely strict with you". So Parliament can be certain that the next time it is dealing with a directive under this whole plan it can tighten the screws. The Commission knows that. So why should the Commission frustrate the wishes of Parliament by doing something that is not really proper? That is the third point.
Fourthly, in the year 2004 there will be a review of the whole process and this – my fifth point – will be steered by the Monitoring Committee, an interinstitutional committee on which Parliament will be represented. The Monitoring Committee will not keep silent if it thinks that the procedures are being abused and the Commission is allowing itself too much latitude.
My sixth point is Parliament can pass a resolution saying that the Commission is
that it is going beyond what is consistent with the law. Again, the Commission would take full account of that opinion and reconsider the whole proposal.
These six measures should allay the fear, which I understand but which is not justified, that the Commission would disregard Parliament's opinion. The Commission cannot and will not do so. Therefore, I do not think there are any grounds for wanting a callback possibility. I can find no provision for it in the Treaty or in the 1999 comitology procedure.
Lastly, two Members of Parliament have mentioned something they think has happened in the Council, namely that the Council wants to have a stronger position for itself than is consistent with a balanced relationship between the three institutions. I cannot speak for the Council. The Council proceedings are not open and therefore it is very difficult to comment. But if there should be any attempt to lower the bar of a qualified majority vote to a simple majority vote, that would meet with the strongest objections from the Commission. After all, a single majority vote is almost never mentioned in the Treaty. We know what unanimous votes are and we know what qualified majority votes are. Simple majority votes are perhaps used for procedural matters, but not for anything of substance. So the Commission will firmly oppose any moves towards lowering the decision-making system from a qualified majority vote to a simple majority vote. As I said, I cannot speak for the Council and it is only with great reluctance that I am commenting on something that may or may not be true.
First of all, Mr von Wogau said that he welcomes the use of regulations and also the fast-track procedure. I would agree with him in his sentiment. Certainly regulations and a fast-track procedure would help to speed up legislation. Mr von Wogau said that perhaps as a pilot project a pension fund could be used to show how quickly these procedures could be used. Certainly, the Commission would like to see the pension fund directive become a reality as soon as possible.
However, certain articles in the Treaty concerning the internal market mention directives and not regulations. Naturally we have to stay within the confines of the Treaty, so where the Treaty says "directives" we cannot use regulations. But I agree with Parliament that regulations are usually – although not always – faster than directives.
Mr Goebbels asked if the new procedures would speed up legislation. As I have explained, they would. Also the comitology procedure provides for short deadlines and therefore it would also speed up the whole process. Mr Goebbels then asked whether the Securities Committee would consist of Secretaries of State. I am afraid I cannot answer that question. The Securities Committee has delegates coming from various Member States and it is up to the Member States to decide who represents them on that committee. So I cannot comment on that. As I said, Member States will nominate their own representatives. What is important is that these representatives should show a real European spirit, are prepared to work closely together and are technically competent.
I now come to the matter of transparency, which has been raised by a number of Members of Parliament. I agree with all those who have emphasised the importance of transparency throughout the legislative process and indeed the report by Mr Lamfalussy and his colleagues makes various references to the need for transparency. The Commission wholeheartedly endorses that.
Mr Herzog said this is a cumbersome intergovernmental procedure instead of a single European regulator. The procedures set out in this report are not intergovernmental. For example, the Securities Committee – which is an important committee in this respect – will not be a Council working group. It will be a regulatory committee in the sense of the 1999 comitology decision; it will be chaired by the Commission. So it is not an intergovernmental committee. The decision of the Lamfalussy committee not to propose a single European regulator at this stage is the result of a full and thorough consultation process. As the report states, it may be necessary to look at the possibility of a single regulator when the whole procedure is reviewed in 2004 if the process that is currently proposed is not satisfactory, but not before.
Let me now answer a few points that were raised this evening. I am grateful to Mrs Villiers and Mr Medina Ortega for their kind words, although to me it is only natural that I should be present here when a subject falling within my portfolio is discussed.
Mr Medina Ortega said that the European Union's legislation is complex, which is true. Normally there is a government and a parliament. We have a triangular relationship, the Commission, Parliament and the Council. That makes it more difficult. The fact that there are 15 Member States further complicates the procedure. He said that the whole system for dealing with executive measures under the comitology procedure is like the horse designed by a committee which turns out to be a camel. Indeed there was a committee, the Lamfalussy committee. But the whole idea of a comitology procedure is to get the implementing measures through more speedily. That is a purpose I share.
I must say, however, that the matter of secondary legislation is a very important one. In many Member States – in Germany and the Netherlands for example – there is a definite procedure for dealing with secondary legislation, which the European Union lacks. There is no provision in the Treaty for dealing with secondary legislation in this way. Parliament, the Council and the Commission would be well advised to think about the need for a proper system of dealing with secondary legislation. Since this whole process will be reviewed in 2004 let us hope that at the same time we can look into the matter of secondary legislation. Then if we manage to work out a clear plan it can be taken up in the Intergovernmental Conference which will hopefully start in 2004."@en1
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