Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-03-13-Speech-2-212"
| Predicate | Value (sorted: default) |
|---|---|
| rdf:type | |
| dcterms:Date | |
| dcterms:Is Part Of | |
| dcterms:Language | |
| lpv:document identification number |
"en.20010313.14.2-212"2
|
| lpv:hasSubsequent | |
| lpv:speaker | |
| lpv:translated text |
"Mr President, ladies and gentlemen. I would like to thank Mr Bösch for his report. It takes as its starting point the Commission's Annual Report on protecting the Communities' financial interests and the fight against fraud, which the Commission presented on 13 November 2000 and which also contains statistics on cases of irregularities and fraud reported by the Member States, as they are obliged to do.
With reference to the butter case, I would like to say once again that it is the subject of legal investigations being carried out by the various Member States affected. On the Stockholm affair, which you also mention in your report, I can tell you that this is also before the courts. I very much hope, and, of course, this is in the Commission's interest as well, that the Swedish courts will very soon come to a conclusion.
Concerning the issue of a European Public Prosecutor with limited jurisdiction, as opposed to the full concept, our investigations indicate – and this is also OLAF's legal view – that there is no legal basis for this, and that a treaty amendment would be needed to achieve this also.
You also mentioned the subject of what I might call legal supervision of the work of OLAF itself. This question is certainly still open. The Director-General of OLAF has undertaken to make a manual available very shortly so as to make it transparent what rules OLAF follows when it makes a decision about carrying out or closing an investigation.
I would also like to point out that since the last debate here the Commission has brought an action against two tobacco companies regarding alleged involvement in international smuggling, an issue that has been mentioned here. I am, of course, pleased that you support this in your report, Mr Bösch. The Commission has also introduced a more effective early warning system within its bookkeeping procedures, so as to alert the various administrative offices as quickly as possible if, for instance, there are plans to enter into a contract with a party already known for irregularities.
With regard to Mrs Theato's question about the signing of the Convention on the protection of the financial interests of the European Community, some Member States have still to sign it. I can name three Member States that have not yet ratified the Convention, namely Belgium, Luxembourg and Ireland, for example. However, not all the other Member States have ratified it either. For that reason, and we have already had occasion to discuss this in this Chamber – the Commission will now be being bringing forward a proposal for a directive designed to transfer the provisions of this Convention into a directive, so as to put greater pressure on the Member States to incorporate in their national law a uniform definition of the offence of fraud against the interests of the European Communities. I hope that will happen in April. The Commission is working with OLAF on a Green Paper concerning the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor's Office, because we do not intend to give that idea up and will now be seizing the opportunity for a more open and wide-ranging debate. Our objective is quite clear, and that is that when the Treaties are revised again in 2004, we hope to have such broad-based support that the Heads of State and Government will no longer be able simply to ignore this proposal.
A few months earlier, the Commission had presented an extensive strategy report in which it set out an approach to fraud prevention at a wide variety of levels and which contained a wide variety of instruments ranging from checks on legislation, in order to make it less susceptible to fraud, to a proposal for a European Public Prosecutor which the Commission put forward in Nice and which was unfortunately not accepted by the Heads of State and Government at that stage.
In that report, the Commission also set out the overall and central role played by the European Anti-Fraud Office, OLAF, and I would first like to address the points made by honourable Members during the debate and also in Mr Bösch's report as regards OLAF.
In 1999 the Council and Parliament created the legal basis for OLAF, and that is, of course, also the basis for action by the Commission on this. In accordance with this legal basis, OLAF was set up as an office which administratively speaking is part of the Commission, that is to say OLAF's staff are Commission officials and are subject to its statute. This also means that if, for example, problems or irregularities arise regarding the behaviour of Commission officials within OLAF, the Commission would be held responsible. In view of this, the Commission has said that, exactly as with the other institutions or other departments of the Commission, it wishes a transparent procedure to be in place for appointing those in senior management positions in OLAF. This means that an Advisory Committee first scrutinises the applications and then makes recommendations to those making the final decision. In the case of OLAF, the Director makes the final decision on the recruitment and appointment of staff. The Advisory Committee is constituted so that members not directly linked to the Commission and those from OLAF itself are in a clear majority. The Court of Auditors, the European Court of Justice and the Supervisory Committee are represented on the Advisory Committee, and I believe that the solution we have now found is a very good one. I would like to remind you once again that this solution is in the interest of transparency in the appointment of senior management, but that the Director or Director-General of OLAF has the final say on appointments.
I hope that a solution will very soon be found as regards further recruitment at OLAF, as I can only repeat that it is certainly not only in my own interest but also in the interest of the Commission as a whole for OLAF to fill all the posts that have actually been agreed as quickly as possible. I think it would also be in the interest of the various parties concerned if they could enter into a dialogue, as the Supervisory Committee has now set further conditions so that the rectifying budget can finally be brought in and this issue resolved.
I would like to briefly cover one point that you touched on in the report and which has also been raised here several times, namely access to OLAF's reports. The legal basis for the establishment of OLAF clearly provides that it is the Director or Director-General of OLAF who makes decisions about reports and not the Commission. Furthermore, the legal basis also stipulates that OLAF must, of course, take account of data protection, professional secrecy and also the investigation procedures, and this is clearly a key point. The Commission accordingly has some doubts as to whether the demands made in the report can be reconciled with the legal basis. Of course, it is also a matter for debate within the European Parliament whether, for example, if OLAF carries out an investigation within Parliament, this report should be transmitted to the Committee on Budgetary Control, to the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market, or to the President. As I see it, this touches on questions affecting all the institutions and I think that this should really be debated and discussed in an appropriate interinstitutional forum such as the trialogue.
As regards OLAF's fitness for purpose, or rather the work done and successes chalked up so far, I would say that uncovering the fraud that we now refer to as the butter case, that is the butter adulteration affair, is one of OLAF's success stories. This discovery was partly possible because OLAF was able to make its information available to the Member States carrying out investigations, and accordingly, at least as OLAF understands it, this helped to ensure that those involved were investigated in a relatively short time.
But the issue of when OLAF can report depends on when OLAF receives authorisation from the Member States, who have the prime responsibility for investigation, to make a report. I say this because all OLAF's work is dependent on close and successful cooperation with the Member States. This is crucial for strengthening OLAF overall, and in particular as regards making it a platform for information exchange.
As regards the Fléchard case dating back to 1991 or 1994, the Commission will also explain its position to the Committee on Budgetary Control and it will, of course, respond in reasonable time to the questionnaire that has been drawn up."@en1
|
Named graphs describing this resource:
The resource appears as object in 2 triples