Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-02-28-Speech-3-119"
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"en.20010228.7.3-119"2
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".
Mr President, Commissioner, ladies and gentlemen, in a short space of time, the European telecommunications industry has, thanks to the impetus given to it by the Community institutions and the innovative action of the market, moved over from a system based on national monopolies to one based on general liberalisation. Market forces and new technologies have pushed this regulatory process forward, generating results in terms of competition and new operators coming into the market, which have in some cases exceeded expectations. The proposed revision of the current regulatory framework governing the telecommunications sector, currently before the European Parliament, consists, therefore, in laying down general objectives from which are derived the regulatory principles governing the new reference framework, basically with the aim of gradually moving the telecommunications market from a phase of market liberalisation to a phase of genuine competition.
The first remark to be made regards the arrangements for imposing obligations on operators notified as having significant market power. In fact, notification does not automatically entail any obligations but the national regulatory authorities have to specify the obligations to be imposed on each operator that has been notified. However, the fact that an operator has significant market power does not always mean that it is misusing that power. When considering whether an operator does or does not have significant market power, national regulatory authorities should at the same time consider whether it is actually using that power before imposing obligations provided for in the directive.
Lastly, environmental impact. An issue which is particularly close to my heart, as a local administrator apart from anything else, is reducing the number of masts in residential areas. Operators are increasingly being forced by technical requirements to install infrastructures which do not fit in with the landscape. It is the duty of the Community institutions, as well as national local authorities, to reduce this impact on the landscape and the environment as much as possible. It is the duty of all policy-makers, at all levels, while safeguarding the importance of competition in the telecommunications market, to find regulatory solutions which allow maximum use of the installations currently available, taking into consideration the impact on the landscape and the environment and the socio-cultural implications for the citizens.
Then there are other points relating to the different taxation systems, in which area there is a call for harmonisation, and to the need for coordination by the European Commission.
Taking all these considerations into account, we can only recommend the proposal for a directive, in that it seeks to stimulate growth in the sector, it will stimulate future investment and enhance the competitiveness of businesses, and, by increasing efficiency, will help to bring about a fall in prices and contribute to economic growth across the board.
The approach to regulating the market should be geared to the future state of markets in which the conditions will be much more competitive and diversified, with the rapid spread of innovative services, and focused on the implementation of competition law, to replace the
rules applied on a case-by-case basis.
This objective can be pursued by means of a body of
rules harmonised at European level, which are of a transitional and exceptional nature. In other words
regulation must provide for its own disappearance once a sufficient degree of competition has been achieved, for excessive regulation is against the interests of the market. With regard to the content of the directive which is the subject of my report, Parliament has identified priorities through its Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy.
The definition of the term 'access': the definitions given in the Commission's proposal were extremely broad and the failure to define terms clearly could have led to disputes with the regulatory authorities. There is a particular risk of the rules and instruments set out in the directive being applied indiscriminately to extremely different situations, such as access for operators and users to end-user services, network facilities, system facilities, networks and roaming.
Roaming warranted more detailed consideration. I do not feel that it should be seen as a form of access, given that it has different connotations according to whether what is involved is enabling a user with a subscription to a foreign operator's network to use a mobile service in a given country and vice-versa – what is known as international roaming – or enabling operators entering the market to use the facilities of existing operators in a given country until such time as they have installed their own networks, which is known as asymmetric roaming.
The principle of light regulation: the report stresses the fact that light regulation and flexibility, central parts of the European legislation, must not mean 'anything goes', but must be a means of overcoming the problems of the current approach involving
regulations which have failed to keep pace with the times and with technological progress. The management of access and interconnection rights in fact requires a balance to be found between the rights of operators which are infrastructure owners to manage their networks and infrastructures for their own benefit and the rights of other operators, which are service providers, to access to essential facilities.
Degree of competitiveness of the market: another point which required clearer definition was the assessment of the degree of competitiveness of the market. The achievement of a high degree of competitiveness is the precondition for reducing the role played by the regulation so as to enable its place to be taken by competition law alone, or, conversely, for subjecting operators that have been notified as having significant market power to regulatory obligations and
subsequent cost orientation negotiations.
The definition of the ‘new significant market power’ is based on Court of Justice judgment and refers to a form of 'reduced' domination, since one of the features of dominance is to 'hamper competition', which is an
concept. The proposal for a directive applies the 'new' significant market power' or 'reduced domination' concept, which, its 'negative' feature of hampering competition having been corrected, leaves the field open to
measures.
Obligations imposed on operators: national regulatory authorities may impose obligations of transparency, non-discrimination, accounting separation, access to and use of specific network facilities, and price control and cost accounting obligations on operators notified as having significant market power. The proposal also lays down arrangements for applying or revising the obligations deriving from the implementation of the current system and those deriving from the new regulatory framework."@en1
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