Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-12-12-Speech-2-306"
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"en.20001212.14.2-306"2
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"Mr President, company structures in the European market need to be made more efficient if Europe is to hold its own in the global market. It must also be possible to restructure companies between one EU country and another.
This directive will probably not create the clear regulations which are now needed on the international stock market, but the battle is not yet lost. The problem is that stock exchange law is closely associated with company law and that it is difficult to harmonise the one area if the other is not harmonised. However the regulations are drawn up, someone will suffer.
In a small market like Sweden’s, with relatively concentrated ownership, harmonising the level at which offers must be made at 30 per cent will create problems, and we are demanding greater flexibility. Greater flexibility is also required when it comes to the complete duty of neutrality recommended by the Council. German companies will have problems because Germany’s company law prohibits vote diversification. Greater understanding must be shown for national characteristics. Otherwise, there may be devastating consequences for an individual Member State’s company structure.
It would, however, be easier to solve the problem of which supervisory authority is to have jurisdiction. The most flexible solution would be to choose the supervisory authority in that country in which the target company has its head office. Companies may be quoted on different markets, and companies with head offices in Sweden are not always quoted in Sweden. It would be strange to say the least if, for example, American authorities were to be responsible for a takeover involving two European companies. Anyone who wants to avoid such consequences has the opportunity to vote in favour of Amendment No 19, which makes it clear that it is the target company’s head office which counts.
If we do not defend the duty of neutrality, there will be no point to the directive. If, moreover, we open the door to defensive measures, we shall perhaps make it more difficult to restructure European markets and, especially, to protect small shareholders.
I just want to emphasise that the Conciliation Committee has a
big responsibility and that success requires everyone to pull together."@en1
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