Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-11-29-Speech-3-140"
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"en.20001129.8.3-140"2
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".
Mr President, first of all I want to thank you for your concern regarding the length of this part-session, but as you know I have been a parliamentarian for 21 years now, so I am impervious to ups and downs of this kind.
Let us not forget that for a period of 50 years we hesitated or failed to give the European Union the minimum capability it needed so as not just to be an impotent witness to crises or outbreaks of violence. Today the only option we have is intergovernmental action. That suits all our democratic nations because it preserves their ultimate right to decide on the use of force. De facto, therefore, it is true that parliamentary control is largely the result of the nations choosing the intergovernmental option.
I would also note, by the way, that the positions adopted by the Council do not, and will not, include any EU budgetary commitment to finance military action of whatever kind. Does that mean there can be no dialogue between the Council, representing the governments, and the European Parliament on defence and security? I think this debate, which everyone has welcomed, is a first demonstration that the opposite is true. I believe we will see a positive dialogue developing.
Why? Because if we remain consistent with the decisions that have been taken, we will see a gradual rise in the European Union's level of responsibility, credibility and influence in crisis management. We will stop being a mere commentator. As a result, public opinion and our parliaments, including this one, will begin to give deeper political thought to the issues involved in resolving crises by a whole range of means, of which armed force is but one component. And the nature of the principles and thoughts set out in the reports by Mr Brok and Mrs Lalumière already show and indeed foreshadow how useful these debates could be.
There will still be other forms of rapprochement to invent with the national parliaments, but at any rate one thing that is within our reach and that represents a turning point I believe we can all welcome, is the fact that the fifteen nations which make up this Union, which have already built a political reality that has a positive effect on the international balance of power, these fifteen nations have chosen to acquire the means to act jointly in cases where violence challenges our values. They are doing so because they believe in our common values. I see that as good news.
I would just add a few words to the comments on Afghanistan and say that the Council is determined to provide humanitarian aid on the ground so long as operational conditions allow it.
I shall then make a few remarks on, obviously, only a few aspects of the very comprehensive debate we have just held on the reports by Mr Brok and Mrs Lalumière, the broad lines of which, I believe, were largely endorsed. This, of course, encourages the governments in the work they are doing and will, I think, support the Nice Council.
Let me start with the question of the position of defence capabilities within the European Union's spectrum of political and practical instruments. As many speakers have said, among the means at the European Union's disposal, military means must be used only by last resort. Obviously I must emphasise this principle, which is the one the governments uphold. But what does "by last resort" mean? It means when everything else has failed and that is the only option. We saw this happen in Europe two years ago, and in Kosovo a year and a half ago. All the political and diplomatic efforts, all the economic pressure, could not prevent the outbreak of violence in the heart of Europe and the unacceptable challenge that posed to all our European values. So armed force is certainly a last resort. But if we want it to prevent the unacceptable, it must be reliable and credible.
I also think that the European Union has the specific ability to combine these various instruments and that what we must do, if this policy progresses and becomes consolidated, is to develop a genuine European culture of conflict prevention and management. We have learned from past experience and are still learning, especially in the Balkans, that thanks to their historical experience, with all the many conflicts, thanks to their understanding of the subtle and at times tough nature of confrontations between communities, the Europeans can develop a savoir-faire and methods of conflict management that are worthy of it and worthy of respect.
On the question of duplication, let me point out that the resources, the military assets the nations have freely accepted to provide for this joint force, are the same capabilities most of these nations make available to the Atlantic Alliance. There is no duplication of forces. They are the same forces, with the same level of preparation and readiness that most of our nations have – of course I belong to one of the nations that is not a member of the Alliance. But in regard to all those nations that are members of the Atlantic Alliance, there is no duplication in their defence effort between forces to provide support for the Alliance's activities and forces that could be made available to the European Union.
On the question of the concept: this concept was adopted in 1992. It relates to the Petersberg tasks. They are enshrined in an agreement between European governments, which provides lines of conduct that are, in my view, well-tried and very broadly endorsed by European public opinion. Any action that had to be taken would obviously have to be decided by the governments on a basis of consensus, and as several speakers said, if we emphasise in the declarations that we are not talking about a European army, that means that clearly there is no authority superior to the nations that could force them to commit their forces to any operation whatsoever.
So Europe is not about to form a new alliance as some people, who are not, I believe, fully informed, have suggested. It will operate on the basis of national decisions taken in the framework of intergovernmental cooperation under the control of the national parliaments, in respect for the Petersberg tasks and in compliance, as we have also said in our declarations, with the principles of the United Nations Charter. I believe that the European security and defence policy will move in the direction of providing an additional capability, practical support for the role of the United Nations, which is to resolve conflicts, including cases where the belligerents have to be kept apart.
That is my reply to a comment made by one speaker to the effect that the United Kingdom and France concluded an agreement in Saint Malo that would restrict the European Parliament's rights. That is not what it was about. The agreement reached in Saint Malo, which was primarily an agreement between the fifteen nations, was that if they wanted Europe to have a practical, effective capacity for action in the defence field, this could only be achieved on an intergovernmental basis."@en1
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