Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-11-29-Speech-3-109"

PredicateValue (sorted: default)
rdf:type
dcterms:Date
dcterms:Is Part Of
dcterms:Language
lpv:document identification number
"en.20001129.8.3-109"2
lpv:hasSubsequent
lpv:speaker
lpv:translated text
". Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, as I speak to you today, I am aware of taking part in a key turning point in the life of Europe, because this is, I think, the first time that a Minister of Defence has addressed your Parliament. On 24 October, I reviewed the progress of a European defence system with your Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights and Common Security and Defence Policy. I am delighted to continue in this vein by talking to you today about the results of our conference on military commitments of 20 November. I should like to make another comment on this overall project to improve European capabilities. Some people have suggested that this illustrates the shortcomings and weaknesses of the European people. I shall simply say, however, that these shortcomings and weaknesses have existed for a long time and that until now, no one in politics has shown any concern about this, at least at European level. The action that we have set in motion has given Europeans the opportunity to shoulder their responsibilities, to look towards the future, potentially to use their forces to promote democratic political aims and to adopt resolutions on subjects that have remained unresolved for many years. A new dynamic has therefore been launched on the basis of an action demonstrating political will on the part of our Member States. This will be credible only if it lasts and that is why we have adopted a follow-up and assessment mechanism that will be adopted by the Nice Council. This mechanism will enable us to gauge our progress. It is underpinned, of course, by the independence of the European Union’s decision making and by the acknowledgement of the voluntary and political nature of the commitments that have been given. It will therefore enable us to compare the commitments given by Member States with their later decisions and I think that this will encourage or inspire governments to take the appropriate decisions. As you see, Europeans are bent on undertaking a sustained effort in order to give credibility to a European defence system. This will require the rapid implementation of the decisions that are taken. Our fifteen nations have set themselves the target of making this Force operational, I repeat, by 2003. Our desire is that the permanent bodies be put in place as quickly as possible after the Nice Council. In 2001, and this task will fall to our friends in the Swedish Presidency, the system will have to be made operational, especially the European Union’s defence staff. This will quickly have to establish its own facilities and proper working procedures. By 2003, when the bodies that have been established are in a position to fulfil their duties, the European Union will gradually become capable of accomplishing some of the Petersberg tasks. These are a few remarks, which have had, out of necessity, to be concise and as a result, incomplete in order to adhere to the rules of your Parliament, on the assessment that can be made today of the real achievements in the field of military capabilities, which have already been adopted or are about to be adopted, by the Nice European Council. Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, I should like to take a few words to describe the profound political significance, which has been approved by the majority of public opinion in our countries, of this new task that will provide Europe with a tool for political influence that it has, until now, lacked. This achievement is the result of a clear political will on the part of our governments, which is in stark contrast to the many disappointments that we have seen since the beginning of European integration. For this I wish to thank my fellow Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Ministers for Defence, who have enabled this substantial progress to be made and I must, of course, thank the European Parliament for the interest it has shown in this new major project. I wish, first of all, to express my agreement with the wording of your resolution of 21 November on the European security and defence policy. You claim that this policy does not aim to compete with the North Atlantic Alliance, which remains today the foundation of the collective defence of its members, or to establish a permanent European army. The Presidency and, I believe, all our governments share this view. Our aim is to gain the capability, by 2003, of coordinating our armies to fulfil the Petersberg tasks, should the Council decide to launch a military operation on behalf of the Union. In the vital area of military capability, at Helsinki, our States set themselves the overall target of being in a position, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and to sustain for at least one year, forces of up to the size of an army corps, in other words, 60 000 soldiers. These forces should be self-sufficient in military terms and should have the necessary capabilities for command, control, intelligence, and for other support units, as well as air and naval backup. Our Member States also decided, again at the Helsinki Council, a year ago, to rapidly establish collective targets for strategic capabilities. The Fifteen have successfully achieved the difficult task of making these objectives a reality in military and technical terms. I wish to emphasise the quality of the completely new work that has been carried out by our States’ military experts, under the auspices of the interim military body, which was only created in March. I would also like to highlight the genuineness and effectiveness of the cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance, which enabled us to have a fruitful exchange on the development of these new capabilities. As a result, we now have detailed military planning documents, which have just been adopted by the General Affairs Council. Firstly, we have the catalogue of capabilities, a 300-page document which scrupulously lists all the military capabilities that are known to be needed by our Union in order to guarantee that all of the Petersberg tasks can be fulfilled. I would remind you of the wide range of tasks that this covers: humanitarian aid, the evacuation of nationals, conflict prevention and also the separation by force of the warring parties. We now have this catalogue of capabilities, which has been adopted by the whole Union. We also now have a catalogue of forces that records the voluntary contributions of each Member State. These contributions, which were confirmed by the Fifteen at the conference on 20 November, form a pool of more than 100 000 men, around 400 combat aircraft and 100 naval vessels. These contributions therefore enable us, in terms of quantity, to fully meet the overall target set by the Council. I would like to make two specific points relating to these numbers. I could, of course, add many other facts and figures, but I would like to be concise. These numbers relate to a mechanism that is designed to be maintained for a European Union operation for at least one year, which means that each country will have, in line with the contribution that it has stated, a reserve force that will enable it to provide the necessary relief forces. Furthermore, although I mentioned the figure of 100 000 soldiers, this does not mean that we are seeking to exceed the target set in Helsinki, but that we will have a reserve of qualified forces and forces with various areas of expertise, which will enable us to guarantee that the figure of 60 000 personnel in the Council’s target would be reached whatever operational conditions they may be required to work in. I wish, briefly, to comment on these figures in order to emphasise that if the European Union has taken the decision to provide itself with military capabilities, it cannot carry out this decision on an unrealistic basis. These capabilities must be sound and credible, because, as everyone here can imagine, and as I can attest from personal experience, when a democratic political authority faced with a situation of violence to which it cannot fail to react decides to use force, it cannot afford to take a gamble. It must have complete confidence in the credibility of its forces. The catalogue that I have just discussed was not the only result of this conference of commitment. We also reached agreement on continuing work to improve the quality of these forces. The Member States committed themselves to implementing medium- and long-term tasks to improve both their operational and strategic capabilities. We gave a particular commitment, under the current reforms of our armed forces, referred to just now by Mrs Lalumière, to continuing to increase our own capabilities and to coordinating existing projects, implementing national or multinational solutions to improve the performance of our forces. What we need to do above all is to increase the speed of deployment, the ability to keep forces on the ground and the power of coordination, which together make up what we call the interoperability of European forces. We must improve our strategic capabilities, especially strategic mobility, in order to rapidly move forces into the field. We must also provide further support for the senior officers to command and control the forces and improve the resources for training them. Finally, we wish to improve some of the European forces’ operational capabilities. In particular, we have identified research and combat rescue, defence instruments against ground-to-ground missiles, high-precision weapons and logistical support. These incorporate most of the suggestions made in your resolution of 21 November."@en1

Named graphs describing this resource:

1http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/rdf/English.ttl.gz
2http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/rdf/Events_and_structure.ttl.gz

The resource appears as object in 2 triples

Context graph