Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-11-29-Speech-3-104"
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"en.20001129.8.3-104"2
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"Mr President, Mr President of the Council – whom I address today in your capacity as President of the Council of Defence Ministers – Commissioner, I believe that the development of our foreign, security and defence policy has generally been extremely encouraging over the past year. Since we are always taking the Commission and the Council to task here, let me say from the outset that I should like to congratulate them today, because the manner in which this week's decisions have gradually implemented the Cologne and Helsinki declarations is the result of some excellent work, for which I wish to compliment all participants.
In this context, Mr President of the Council, I also believe that in Afghanistan in particular, a country we ought to speak about here, we should play our part in ensuring that firstly a stop can, at long last, be put to the trail of murder which has plagued that country for decades and which a barbarous regime is now pursuing against its own people and secondly in ensuring that the people in Afghanistan are able to live in a rational, peaceful and socially just world. We should try to make our contribution there too.
Following our painful experiences in the former Yugoslavia, experiences which showed that peacekeeping and civilian crisis management are ineffectual if they are not accompanied by a clear message that they can be enforced by military means if the need arises, the Governments of the fifteen Member States, the Council and the Commission learned their lessons and have now made considerable progress. I hope that the implementation of these decisions will not remain a mere paper exercise but that it will also be reflected in the appropriations in national budgets, which is where the executive power lies in this case.
There is no use in having a hundred thousand troops if they are all lame and blind. Our troops are rendered lame by the fact that the European Union and its Member States do not possess the necessary transport capacities. They will be blind for as long as we do not have the essential intelligence facilities, such as satellite systems, which would make it possible to deploy these troops as wisely and effectively as circumstances dictate. At the same time, we also agree that the sequence of responses is correct. The use of military force is the last resort. Our main task is to ensure, by means of a judicious policy of prevention and astute civilian crisis management, that it is never necessary to use military force.
To this end, I believe that we must also initiate close cooperation between the institutions of the European Union and the Member States. The Community is largely responsible today for civilian crisis management and prevention as well as for all the associated instruments. The European Union has four times as much money in its budget for foreign aid as the United States. Many important aspects of trade policy lie within the purview of the Commission. I believe that, if this interaction between the civilian and military authorities is to work, we must ensure that there is no institutionalised duplication of effort or duality of purpose but that the civilian and military efforts are yoked together.
In point of fact, before Amsterdam both the European Parliament and the Commission took the view that it would be best to have a Vice-President of the Commission with responsibility for foreign policy who would also assume the role of the High Representative and would have a special obligation to and link with the Council. This did not prove to be politically acceptable, which is why we now have two figures, both of whom perform sterling work in their own way. The problems do not lie with them, but rather in the institutional ramifications, and we must try to keep such problems to an absolute minimum.
This view, moreover, also relates to the European Parliament. The European Parliament very much wants to be involved in the formulation and pursuit of this policy, as the Treaties prescribe – and perhaps the Treaty of Nice will improve the relevant provisions – and as is laid down in the interinstitutional agreement between the Council, the Commission and Parliament on the budgetary responsibilities of the European Parliament in matters of foreign and security policy. To be precise, civilian crisis management also lies within the budgetary responsibility of the European Parliament and, naturally, of the Council too, whereas defence policy remains a budgetary responsibility of the national parliaments, because the armed forces are not yet European forces but are still subject to their national governments and parliaments. Mobilisation orders are also a national responsibility, because each country takes a sovereign decision as to whether or not it will participate in a joint operation.
Now that this division of responsibilities is crystal clear, we must ensure that we create a negotiating level between the European Parliament and the national parliaments, so that we as parliamentarians, through exchanges of information at various levels, are able to monitor the national executives in an appropriate way. Decision making on foreign, security and defence policies is the task of the executive branch. We decide on the money and check whether it is being spent wisely and whether prudent policies are being pursued. I believe that a sound strategy will be developed on this basis. Talks are already taking place between the European Parliament and the national parliaments on this subject with a view to ensuring that the system develops in a rational manner.
When I speak of organisation, I also mean that the European Union, which makes such strenuous efforts in this field, should be given a corresponding degree of responsibility. I can see that things are not working sufficiently well in Kosovo, for example, and that we shall soon need a coordinator for the coordinators, because so many institutions are involved – not the European institutions but many others – and we must get that under control. I only included this as one small aspect of my report; it is covered by Mrs Lalumière's report, which focuses far more sharply on this point.
But we know that, in many parts of the world, such as the Middle East or Southern Asia, where the Kashmir conflict is a potential tinderbox, the international community is waiting for the European Union to be able to engage in mediation, so that there will be more shoulders to share the burden of responsibility in this domain. For this reason, we bear a high degree of responsibility for safeguarding peace, both here in Europe and in the world at large. I hope that this new mechanism will gradually enhance our ability to meet that responsibility."@en1
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