Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-10-25-Speech-3-248"

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". Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, eight years on from Rio de Janeiro and three years on from Kyoto it is no exaggeration to say that the dossier on climate change has now reached its most critical moment, its real moment of truth, for two basic reasons: first, because at an institutional level COP-6, which will take place in The Hague this November, is to draw up the Kyoto Protocol in its final form and initiate the Protocol ratification stage so that it can come into force by the ‘Rio Plus Ten’ Conference, i.e. by 2002. Secondly it is a critical moment because, at a domestic level, we are moving further away instead of getting closer to the reduction targets agreed at Kyoto, because of the failure by Member States to implement policies and measures on, for instance, energy efficiency, the promotion of renewable energy sources and taxation on energy and greenhouse gases. In this extraordinarily challenging context, we applaud the Commission’s initiative in bringing out together the Green Paper on emissions trading and the communication ‘Towards a European climate change programme’. Even though the substance of the proposals deserves a few comments and a few criticisms, as you will see, the truth is that this initiative has sent out two incontrovertible political signals. To the outside world it has regenerated the European Union’s capacity for leadership. Within the Union it has taught us a lesson about meeting commitments. Let us begin by examining the Green Paper on ‘emissions trading’. This Green Paper has opened the debate on the architecture of a future emissions trading system within the European Union. To start the system off, the Commission has defined a hard core of premises: the system should be based on a ‘learning by doing’ approach, it should start in 2005, and during an initial stage it should be restricted to carbon dioxide and major point sources. In my view, and this is reflected in the report, the establishment of a system of this kind within the European Union from 2005 has undeniable benefits. Let me highlight three. First, this system will allow industries, companies and Member States to gain practical experience and prepare themselves economically for the 2008 launch of the emissions trading system at an international level. Secondly, this system will help provide an easier remedy to the situation that most Member States are in today of not meeting their targets. Thirdly, the system will enable us to make huge reductions, in the order of billions of euros per year, in the costs of implementing the Community’s Kyoto commitments. Despite the merits of this initiative and the technical quality of the Green Paper, on which we congratulate the Commission, the coverage of certain points is rather limited. Thus the task of this report has been to extend the debate begun by the Green Paper in both breadth and depth. That is our task. Let me highlight six points from my considerations. One: the Green Paper should have set quantified targets for greenhouse gas reduction to be attained by the emissions trading system; in other words, the Green Paper should have said what percentage of greenhouse gas reduction would be allocated to emissions trading. Two: I believe the Green Paper should not have avoided carrying out an analysis into the possibility that the emissions trading system might give nuclear energy a competitive advantage. Three: I believe it is essential that the system should in future embrace certain sectors that the Green Paper has ruled out for now, especially transport, which is the sector in which emissions are growing the fastest. Four: in the debate on the scope of the system, the Commission should not have set direct emissions trading between companies as the only possible option. There are other options, and I hope the Commission will soon consider all the alternatives. Five: I believe it is crucial to involve the countries applying for membership of the European Union in the emissions trading system as soon as possible. To this end I invite the Commission to present a plan in a forthcoming communication specifying how those countries can be brought into the emissions trading system. Lastly, point six: I believe that, with regard to the method of allocating emissions licences, auctions could more easily ensure the desired environmental result, non-distortion of competition and the simplicity of the system than ‘grandfathering’ could. But this is not the appropriate moment to exclude any method, and so I invite the Commission to continue its deliberations and to include a third option, too: benchmarking. Let us now examine the communication on the European climate change programme. In view of the commitment and quality of the Green Paper on emissions trading, the communication on policies and measures, the communication ‘Towards a European climate change programme’ is a disappointment. It is a disappointment because it results in the role of policies and measures, in other words, the role of domestic and Community political action, being sidelined in favour of market mechanisms. It is also a disappointment because this communication results in an unbalanced treatment of the various economic sectors; in particular it was hoped that those sectors that were not included in the emissions trading system might see the approval of an ambitious approach with well-defined commitments in the other communication, the one on policies and measures. I therefore call on the Commission to conclude the European climate change programme, the ICCP, with some urgency and to submit, six months after COP-6, a set of specific proposals on policies and measures defining quantitative commitments on the reduction of greenhouse gases for each economic sector and for each policy and measure. Let me very briefly say a few words about the forthcoming United Nations conference, COP-6, which will take place in The Hague this November. The difficulty with COP-6 is not just a result of the complexity of the Kyoto leftovers but also of the political situation in the United States. Note that, regardless of the result of the American elections, it will be Bill Clinton and Al Gore who will be negotiating the Kyoto Protocol in The Hague. So we face some extremely worrying scenarios. If Bush wins, all the agreements we make in The Hague with the Clinton administration may be totally ignored by the new administration. If Al Gore wins, there is nothing to prevent it continuing to be very difficult to find the two-thirds majority in the Senate needed to ratify the Protocol. I therefore think that the European Union should not give up its negotiating agenda. The European Union has a good negotiating agenda and should not give it up. If we give it up in the hope of reaching an agreement with the United States, we risk ending up with a lose-lose result: we will have weakened the text of the Protocol and, what is more, it may even fail to be ratified by the United States. That is why we have to give signs of opening up towards Russia, Canada, Japan, Norway and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. I should like to close, Mr President, by thanking all the Members, particularly the draftsmen of opinions and shadow draftsmen, for having made it possible to reach a broad consensus on the strategy for halting climate change."@en1

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