Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-09-20-Speech-3-057"
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"en.20000920.5.3-057"2
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"Mr President, this report deals with issues which are of very great importance to personal privacy and data protection. Within the EU, extensive registers of personal data are now being compiled in which very sensitive personal information is stored. At the same time, it is obvious that these registers are inadequately supervised and insufficiently secure.
Those of us in the Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left are obviously keen to improve data protection and supervision. We therefore support the idea of introducing a single independent supervisory authority with proper powers and resources. To that extent, we are in favour of the basic ideas in this report but we wish, however, to point out that it is important to construct this supervisory authority on the basis of the skills possessed by the Member States in this area.
A new supervisory authority must be able to cover all the relevant registers, including the Eurodac register which has a major role to play in the EU’s asylum policy. Refugees are an especially vulnerable group, and information contained on a register can be a direct reason for deporting people and so have serious consequences for an asylum seeker. It is therefore especially important to be able to see to it that the register contains accurate information, that the asylum seeker is provided with information about his or her rights and that there are opportunities for appeal. Moreover, the Sirene organisation established under the Schengen agreement must be covered by a new supervisory authority. By and large, the relatively little known Sirene can send any personal data at all between Member States at short notice, as well as combine data relating to ordinary police matters with that concerning state security and policy on refugees. The whole of the Sirene organisation suffers from a palpable lack of public and parliamentary control.
We already have significant experience in this area when it comes to dealing with the Schengen agreement’s large register of personal data, SIS. That experience is unfortunately very disheartening. The Joint Supervisory Authority, or JSA, has had quite inadequate resources. Moreover, it has been denied access to important information in SIS. This may be seen from the JSA’s first annual reports. In spite of the difficult working conditions, the JSA reveals serious deficiencies in SIS, for example incorrect information on file, instances of Member States’ illegally copying information and inadequate procedures for gaining access to registers. This is completely unacceptable.
In order to obtain effective data protection, more than effective supervision is required. More basic changes are needed when it comes to the rules governing the registers. One requirement is that registers of criminals be distinguished from registers of refugees and registers kept to protect state security. These different areas must
be covered by joint organisations and registers. Public and parliamentary control must be reinforced, especially when it comes to Sirene and Schengen. Moreover, clear limits must be set for what may be recorded in Europol’s investigation register, founded upon Article 10.1 of the Europol Convention. At present, the scope of the register goes far beyond what is necessary. People who are not suspected of crimes may be registered, and sensitive personal data about political views, religious affiliation and sexual orientation may be recorded. That is unreasonable. A central place must be given to personal privacy and legal rights."@en1
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