Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-07-04-Speech-2-028"
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"en.20000704.2.2-028"2
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Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, this is our second debate on granting discharge to the Commission for the 1998 financial year. On 13 April, Parliament decided by a majority to postpone the discharge and ask the Commission to supply further reports and information. Naturally the Commission abided by Parliament’s wishes and on 11 May it submitted the following documents, among others: the Financial Controller’s report on the corrections made to ex-ante controls, a report on the conclusions drawn from the investigative committee into customs procedures, a report and overview in connection with the contracts of scientific visitors, a report on the number of disciplinary proceedings associated with financial irregularities undertaken since 1998 and the outcome thereof.
The present report is critical of current financial control because ex-ante control is said not to have denied any requests for payment. However, that is no indication as to whether financial control does or does not work. I would again point out that even the Court of Auditors has said that the errors it uncovered could not have been detected ex-ante, and the Commission has taken this to mean that we must substantially reinforce ex-post control, by setting up an independent revision service, for example.
The Commission has other priorities besides improving financial management, avoiding errors and delays, for example, and improving the efficiency with which funds in short supply are employed, because it is also absolutely intent on fighting fraud.
This concerns the future and the past. I repeat: the Commission has nothing to hide, and so I will also address the questions the House has raised in connection with the Fléchard case. The Court of Auditors has reviewed the decision taken by the offices of the Commission in 1994, i.e. six years ago. The Commission set out to ensure that the report and the response from the Commission, which also details the sequence of events, would not be kept secret or confidential but would be officially available, and indeed they can now be called up on the Internet.
However, it is still a moot point in the debate between the Court of Auditors, as to whether the Commission is entitled, or perhaps even obliged, to apply the principle of proportionality when fixing financial penalties. The current Commission takes the view that it is entitled to do so. Whilst the Court of Auditors considers that only the courts can apply the principle of proportionality, we believe that this is a general administrative principle. The former Commission felt the same and I would like to quote what Mr Schmidhuber, the erstwhile Commissioner for the budget and financial control, had to say on the Fléchard case. He wrote: “In the opinion of the Financial Controller, this does not rule out reaching a negotiated solution with regard to the principle of proportionality”. Therefore, there is agreement on this point, and, at the same time, the Commission, for its part, suggested that it would have been worthwhile investigating in more detail at the time, why the exported butter was diverted from its destination in Russia and ended up being sold in Poland. As to whether we should have demanded the return of the money, I would again point out that this depended on legal proceedings before the Irish High Court. This culminated in a legally valid settlement, which is something the present Commission is also bound by of course.
The Commission must uphold the principles and rules of legality in the current fight against fraud and in the efforts being made to shed light on cases from previous years. The same applies to information issues. If OLAF is asked, in preliminary investigations taking place at Member State level, to pass on information for reasons of investigation secrecy, at an appointed time, then this is a binding legal basis for OLAF. This applies to the Director of OLAF as it does to the Commission. In this connection, I would again point out that OLAF is independent where investigations are concerned and it was this very House that insisted on this being so at the drafting of the corresponding legal basis. This means that OLAF is also independent with regard to reporting procedures and that we still need an answer to the question as to whether information belonging to OLAF can be published by the Director, in full implementation of his responsibilities.
Turning now to the question as to whether further contracts were concluded with the Fléchard firm, I have advised the committee that for its part, the Commission can say that there were further contracts in the sphere of invitation to tender procedures, and concerning the question as to whether export contracts were concluded at national level or whether export business was conducted, I would point out that the payment of individual recipients throughout the agricultural sector can only take place at Member State level. This follows from the fact that the payments offices are responsible for payments. The Commission can apply for access to the data pursuant to a regulation, and is able to investigate which payments go where.
However, I feel I should also point out that Regulation 2390/1999 states that the Commission safeguards the confidentiality and security of electronic data transmitted by the Member States. The Commission would be more than willing, with the committee’s approval, to ask the Member States to duly respond, that is, to grant the necessary permission for data to be passed on.
I would remind you that the principles to do with passing on information also feature in the agreement between Parliament and the Commission on the transfer of information. This agreement should provide a clear basis for this important aspect of relations between Parliament and the Commission, and consequently, it should also form a sound basis for the procedures pertaining to the discharge process. I would like to thank the Members of the Committee on Budgetary Control, who have contributed enormously, not only to the report, but also to the results, the assessments, the observations, and, above all, to the many proposals for improvement and the challenges we have faced. The Commission will implement the concrete measures of the aforementioned action plan and the comprehensive steps of Commission reform, as well as set up an independent audit service and carry out the audit recommendation to the letter. It will be rigorous in reforming the disciplinary procedures, building OLAF up in staffing and operational terms and implementing the strategy for combating fraud with the aid of comprehensive legislation and stringent and reinforced cooperation with the Member States and other States, with the clear aim of restoring the confidence of the population in the sound management of European finances, first and foremost in conjunction with the European Parliament and the other institutions.
The Commission made it known that it has taken certain measures, with the aid of OLAF, among others, and that it has set up certain action plans in a binding manner and taken the first steps towards implementing the European Development Fund, for example. Although the Court of Auditors had granted the Commission a statement of assurance (albeit restricted) for implementation, the Committee on Budgetary Control, and specifically the rapporteur, Mrs Rühle, were not satisfied with this, instead they wanted and called for more steps to be taken to improve the outcome. I can say without hesitation that the action plan, which was not just drawn up at Parliament’s request, indeed we actually enlisted Parliament’s cooperation, will serve to increase the transparency and efficiency of external aid. I would particularly like to thank those who were themselves working on this issue at the time, for their cooperation, and to reaffirm the Commission’s promise to report every six months on the implementation of the action plan.
In its report on the implementation of the 1998 budget, the European Court of Auditors had granted the Commission a statement of assurance for the revenue side of the budget and also for the implementation of commitment appropriations, but not for the implementation of payments from the budget. The number of errors committed in the implementation of the budget is too high. The Commission, and particularly myself as Commissioner for the budget, are completely in agreement with the Court of Auditors and Parliament on this.
Accordingly, the Commission has already instigated, or rather, adopted, a number of measures to improve the implementation of the budget and reduce, in fact avoid, errors. Firstly we need error prevention measures, such as – to quote but one example – a measure to reduce the number of invitation to tender and award procedures for external aid – be it the PHARE, MEDA or other programmes – from the 80 different procedures we have had up until now (would you believe?) to 40. The reduction of errors also entails better monitoring, which is what the Commission’s administrative reforms are largely designed to achieve. In future, the individual administrations that actually spend European money will have more personnel at their disposal for monitoring purposes, and they will also be able to inspect the monitoring systems in the Member States more effectively..
Reducing errors also involves taking effective punitive measures, making demands for the return of funds, and instigating the necessary disciplinary proceedings in the event of conscious violation of official regulations. I would remind you again that my colleague Mr Kinnock is to submit a draft on the reform of disciplinary proceedings before the summer recess."@en1
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