Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-06-15-Speech-4-150"
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"en.20000615.6.4-150"2
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"(
) Mr President, fellow Members, this resolution deals in a meticulous way with a number of practical problems. I shall not repeat them, as our president, Doris Pack, has explained them better than we could. I would just like to highlight the issue of Kosovar prisoners, as did Mrs Schroedter. This is a fundamental problem and we must persevere in our actions, even if we know that we do not have many weapons to influence the Belgrade regime.
Obviously, there is also all the repression in Serbia. But for the first time, I will admit that I cherish a certain optimism, given the way the Belgrade regime is developing, that it will collapse in the near future. In particular, I am thinking of the student movement, the virtually underground OTPOR movement, and on this subject, I think that the relentlessness with which it is suppressed and monitored by Milosevic’s henchmen is a good indicator of its power.
Having said this, I think it is time for the European Parliament and also the Commission and the Council to engage in a debate – and I know that the president of our delegation does not entirely share this point of view – on the future status of Kosovo, the future status of Bosnia, and therefore also, directly, that of Serbia. The uncertainty surrounding the definitive status of Kosovo today is a source of instability, an incentive to extremists of all types, an obstacle to development, because this situation certainly does not encourage foreign investment.
There is another fact that merits our attention: the presence, in a country with less than two million inhabitants, of over fifty thousand westerners with a standard of living 10, 15, 20 times higher than that of the Kosovars, cannot but present many problems in terms of discrimination and inequality, and is not without secondary effects that are not always as secondary as all that, and are in fact very serious and often very problematic, or even truly adverse. Having said that, I am not questioning the role of the KFOR, the role of the United Nations in Kosovo, at all, but we cannot consider and plan an “occupation” of Kosovo for many years without running serious risks.
We must therefore unreservedly confront the issue of the final status of what was formerly Yugoslavia. Six years after the signature of the Dayton agreements in 1995, with a Bosnia that is still not a country where things run smoothly, with a Bosnia comprising two or even three entities, we must urgently put an end to all these problems and the Commission and the Council must urgently propose ways of overcoming these situations which were designed to be interim situations. We must propose ways out of the situation in order to create a conditions which might form a basis for imagining the integration of these countries into the European Union.
In particular, I do not think we can avoid the idea of a federation between Kosovo and Albania, nor can we avoid associations between certain parts of Bosnia and Serbia. This is the result of a policy which we, the radicals, definitely did not want, but which the international community wanted, and to which we can no longer turn a blind eye."@en1
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