Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-06-15-Speech-4-106"
| Predicate | Value (sorted: default) |
|---|---|
| rdf:type | |
| dcterms:Date | |
| dcterms:Is Part Of | |
| dcterms:Language | |
| lpv:document identification number |
"en.20000615.3.4-106"2
|
| lpv:hasSubsequent | |
| lpv:speaker | |
| lpv:spokenAs | |
| lpv:translated text |
"For several months, the European Union has been treading an extremely complicated path, punctuated by the Cologne, Helsinki and Lisbon Councils and tomorrow by the Feira Council, to try to put in place what is called a ‘common European security and defence policy’. The exercise is complicated, first because it is necessary to try to clarify relations with NATO, and because the United States not to mention other countries in NATO which are not members of the European Union, like Turkey, are not making our task any easier. Everything is also made more difficult by the determination of the Union institutions to extend the scope of this new policy, by presenting it as ‘a further step towards European political integration’, in the words of the resolution we have just voted on. In other words, it is another step towards supra-nationality.
As regards the scope of this security policy, there is deliberate ambiguity. It would not, strictly speaking, be a matter of so-called Petersberg-style tasks (crisis prevention and peacekeeping in third countries, excluding defence of national territory or vital external interests), but the European Parliament constantly insists on raising a much larger objective, a common security and defence policy in the broad sense. In fact, that is the title of the resolution voted on today. Ambiguity is increased by the decision to implement common military resources intended to prevent crises (for example, the European rapid reaction force, of 50 000 to 60 000 men, agreed at Helsinki), which means the ‘integrationists’ can constantly play with words and put it about that there is some question of implementing a defence policy in the full sense of the word.
In terms of both method and objective – political integration or cooperation – we think it is counterproductive to be constantly brandishing the prospect of a unitary and integrated supranational power. To act effectively we need to establish voluntary cooperation, with variable geometry, where Member States of the Union with an interest in this or that action would participate – and there is no reason why non-member states should not participate too, where appropriate.
To summarise, the Union for a Europe of Nations Group believes in advancing towards common security actions, provided we do not get boxed into a rigid institutional system, but instead establish flexible procedures based on voluntary input and respect for national sovereignty.
We are open to the idea of common security actions, which we believe Europe badly needs. But at the same time we must remain very clear about the conditions for them. It is impossible to hand over power of military decision (even if we are initially told that only Petersberg tasks will be involved) to very imperfectly democratic European institutions – and so they will remain, to human eyes, because there is no such thing as a European people.
There are three consequences of that: the national democracies must always have the last word, so the operations concerned must remain in an inter-state context; decisions can in no case be taken by majority on issues of principle; the system must be based on the possibility of ‘differentiated actions’ permitting each people to exercise its freedom of choice without discontinuity.
I hope the Feira Council will decide to add this issue to the Intergovernmental Conference."@en1
|
Named graphs describing this resource:
The resource appears as object in 2 triples