Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-05-16-Speech-2-302"
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"en.20000516.12.2-302"2
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"The Commission is informed of the events surrounding the falsification of the pellet diameter data at the MOX demonstration facility and the BNFL Sellafield site. We are closely following the developments and have made direct contact both with the UK authorities and with the company. The Commission is highly concerned with this event which raises questions in relation to nuclear safety. Before I refer to the specific aspects raised by Mrs Ahern in her question, I would therefore firstly like to state that we cannot tolerate any negligence in relation to nuclear safety within the present and greater European Union. The neglect of internationally agreed nuclear safety standards should be openly and firmly condemned. I am therefore grateful that the European Parliament decided to debate this important issue in plenary tonight and to adopt a resolution later this week.
Another major step forward was taken only last week with the setting up of a European nuclear installation safety group. It will bring together nuclear power plant operators and nuclear regulators from both Member States and applicant states.
I can assure you that the Commission will do everything it can to pursue the objective of a high level of nuclear safety, both within the present Union and an enlarged one. I am convinced that more could be done at Community level to achieve this. However, it is not clear that a directive requiring the harmonisation of safety standards at a European level at this moment in history is the best way forward.
Let me now turn to the first specific issue which is the implications of the MOX data issue for the safety of nuclear installations. Let me first remind the honourable Members that under the International Convention on Nuclear Safety the responsibility for nuclear safety rests with the state having jurisdiction over a nuclear installation. It is also clear that our Member States do not wish to give up this responsibility. I therefore need to refer to the UK and the NII report on the falsification of the data which states that the nuclear installations inspectorate is satisfied that the fuel manufactured in MDF will be safe in use in spite of the incomplete QA records caused by the falsification of some AQL data by process workers in the facility. That is a quote from their report.
However, the inspectors' report on the control and supervision of operations at the BNFL Sellafield site also stated its opinion on the deterioration in safety performance at Sellafield. The company has reacted to the requirement of the NII to produce a programme responding to the recommendations in the report. We are now awaiting the formal reaction of the inspector to this programme.
Secondly, on nuclear safeguards: according to the investigations carried out by the UK nuclear installations inspectorate, the falsification of data occurred during a secondary manual diameter check of a sub-set of the MOX pellets in the Sellafield MOX demonstration facility. As far as Euratom nuclear material safeguards are concerned, checks of the diameter of pellets are not covered since operators' declarations for safeguards are based on pellet weights and not on a diameter measurement. Therefore the verifications performed by Euratom safeguards did not indicate that these declarations had been incorrect.
Thirdly, in relation to the transport of nuclear materials, transport of radioactive material is implemented according to regulations that are elaborated by the IAEA and transposed into national legislation. Therefore, also for the transport of radioactive material the prime responsibility lies with the Member States.
As such the measurement deviations at Sellafield do not have any consequences on the safe transport of pellets. However, the Commission welcomes any decision which would increase even further the safe transport of nuclear material. The Commission has as its objective to promote the harmonisation of the regulations in the field of transport of radioactive material, which would increase safety in the field.
Finally, regarding the concept of proposing a Euratom directive for harmonising minimum standards for nuclear safety in the European Union and its value in discussions of nuclear safety with the accession states: individual EU Member States' safety requirements are more specific and demanding than those of the International Atomic Agency. Because of different historical background, legal framework, type and numbers of reactors and different approaches to regulation, they cannot easily be harmonised into a set of common rules. My concern is that any attempt to achieve a consensus on a set of common Euratom safety standards might only result in a very generalised set of rules and principles. As such they would be unlikely to improve on current nuclear installations' safety standards. It is therefore unlikely that harmonising minimum standards at an EU-level would have been able to prevent what happened at Sellafield.
There are, however, several activities at Community level where harmonisation would be both beneficial and possible. These activities are based on common recognition of national requirements and the promotion of best practices. One area where there is scope for in-depth harmonisation is in relation to new types of facilities. I do not see any obstacles to future harmonisation of rules in the field of safe management of radioactive waste and decommissioning of nuclear installations.
In the context of enlargement, a directive setting out harmonised minimum safety standards might have facilitated our early discussions on the very sensitive issue of nuclear safety. As part of the Community's
it then would have been routinely screened together with other EU legislation. However, it is difficult to say if such a directive would be developed quickly enough to play a key role in the ongoing discussions with the accession states. It is also difficult to prejudge if common minimum standards would give us the level of safety that we wish the accession states to aim for. We have in fact set our sights and those of the accession states beyond such a level. We are working to encourage the applicant states to apply the good practices in use in the European Union. One example of this is the development by the DG-Environment of guidelines for periodic safety reviews of the Soviet-designed light water nuclear reactors."@en1
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