Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-04-12-Speech-3-041"
| Predicate | Value (sorted: default) |
|---|---|
| rdf:type | |
| dcterms:Date | |
| dcterms:Is Part Of | |
| dcterms:Language | |
| lpv:document identification number |
"en.20000412.2.3-041"2
|
| lpv:hasSubsequent | |
| lpv:speaker | |
| lpv:translated text |
"Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, the work in the Intergovernmental Conference has been intensive. This time the European Parliament’s participation has been reinforced through your President and two other representatives and also through full dialogue between the Council presidency and your Committee on Constitutional Affairs. This reinforcement also stems from the direct information of this House and its debate in plenary, which have no precedents. This is very encouraging for the future results of the IGC.
As for specific mechanisms to be established for the future system, there is also a split between those who defend a double-majority system and those who prefer simple reweighting. One recurring argument is that the reform should be acceptable to public opinion and likely to be ratified by the national parliaments. This is a common concern of all the Member States, whether large or small, not only due to the need, in ratifying the new Treaty, to enable enlargement and respect for its timetables, but also due to the feeling that a European crisis should not be allowed to occur on this type of reform. There is also the idea that these reforms must be submitted to public opinion in the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe so that the impression is not given that these are reforms which must be rushed through, not to improve the European Union but to prevent the new Member States from having access to the EU’s decision-making system.
With regard to closer cooperation, the need or the usefulness for the IGC to tackle this issue was also discussed in an informal debate. Again there was a division of opinion both about the possibility of this issue being discussed and about the scope and nature of any alterations. The next informal meeting of the Representatives Group on 14 and 15 April in Sintra, Portugal, will deal specifically with this issue which is problematic as there are no examples to follow. There are no specific examples as the Treaty of Amsterdam already allows closer cooperation and so far no Member State has used this instrument and there are no theoretical examples as these are never put forward by the debaters. Although this issue comes up time and again, it is very abstract.
In terms of the substance of the issue and the introduction of closer cooperation into the Second Pillar, an informal debate has revealed that the majority regard this as unnecessary in external or common security policy, although the possibility of its use in the area of security and defence may be considered. This means that if closer cooperation were included within the Second Pillar, it would then be necessary to find a specific way of implementing this concept in this area. This could not copy the First Pillar given the dissimilarity between the operation of these two pillars.
With regard to making the existing model more flexible, as supported in particular by the Commission, a certain openness has been detected towards eliminating the recourse to the European Council when launching closer cooperation. However, the limit of eight Member States has been questioned even by those who support altering the requirement for the participation of the majority of Member States.
As you can see, the Portuguese Presidency is continuing to make every effort to take the work forward in order to achieve a comprehensive and balanced agreement which is acceptable to everyone by the specified deadline. Close contact has been maintained with the Commission and the European Parliament. In the latter case, this has been through both the participation of your President and two selected Members and the regular information provided to the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and this House. This is ensuring that this institutional reform work is carried out with a much higher degree of participation by the European Parliament than the previous revision of the Treaty. This augurs well for the success of our work.
So far five main in-depth meetings of the preparatory group have been held, together with three meetings of the IGC itself. Also planned are all the events in the calendar up to the end of Portugal’s presidency, involving both the IGC and the preparatory group. A report is also to be prepared which will be submitted to the Feira European Council. The Council presidency considers that this report should not be purely theoretical but should also make practical proposals. It must enable the next holder of the Council presidency, which will be France, to continue developing this work and to reach a decision by the end of the year.
The issue tackled at the last IGC meeting was the question of extending qualified majority voting. The Member States demonstrated a certain openness towards this but many have still not made a definitive decision. Certain areas can already be identified on which the attitude of the large majority of Member States is that these should remain subject to the unanimity rule. Debates on these issues reveal that there is actually significant reticence, although this may be overcome during the IGC.
The preparatory work carried out to date has also involved questions connected with the European Parliament, the courts, the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee. As regards the decision-making procedure in the European Parliament, there is broad consensus that no revision of the Treaty should be effected which involves changing the existing institutional balance. As for the scope of codecision, there is some openness towards extending this procedure to all legislative acts adopted by qualified majority without, however, establishing any kind of systematic correlation.
With regard to the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, a group of friends of the Council presidency has been brought together to examine possible amendments to the Treaty relating to these two courts. The study of possible amendments to the Treaty in respect of the Court of Auditors, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions has also been started. Many consider that changes should only be made where strictly necessary to ensure the effective functioning of the European Union after enlargement. Consideration has also been given to matters which may be included on the agenda of the IGC, on the Council presidency’s proposal. It should be recalled that the conclusions of the Helsinki European Council specify that the Council presidency will submit a report to the European Council and may propose in this report the insertion of new items on the IGC’s agenda.
In the area of security and defence and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Council presidency considers that, depending on the progress of the work, the right should be reserved to propose to the Feira European Council next June the inclusion in the IGC of any adjustments or additions to the Treaties which may prove necessary in these areas. With regard to other issues likely to be added to the IGC’s work, an initial debate has been held based on a list drawn up by the Council presidency. The argument put forward in favour of a prudent approach to the inclusion of new items on the agenda concerned the risk, inherent in the technical complexity of this debate, of causing the deadline of this December for the completion of the IGC’s work to be missed.
On the issue of the size and composition of the Commission, there is a consensus that the Commission to emerge from this IGC must be strong, independent and legitimate. Its collegiate nature must be preserved. However, there is clear disagreement between, on one hand, the small and medium-sized Member States which want a Commission composed of one national from each Member State, all with equal status, and, on the other, the large Member States which favour a fixed number of Commissioners regardless of the number of Member States. The size of the Commission is the main point of disagreement between the delegations. The rest of the debate on the Commission is dependent on this issue as some directly link this question with their positions on the composition, internal organisation and structure of this Community institution.
With regard to the individual responsibility of Commissioners, there is general support for keeping the undertaking currently made by each Commissioner to stand down when asked to do so by the Commission President. The delegations are divided into those which want to keep the informality of this undertaking and those which want the process to be enshrined in the Treaty. As for the Commission’s collective responsibility as a college, there is some reluctance to accept alterations to the current institutional framework, with the current supervision exercised by the European Parliament being regarded as sufficient. The idea submitted by this House of the Commission being able to request a vote of confidence in it was positively welcomed.
On the issue of the weighting of votes in Council, there is consensus that the criterion which should be used as the basis for qualified majority voting in Council must stem from the combination of the two elements which form the foundations of the European Union. These are the population and the existence of sovereign states. The EU is just as much a union of peoples as it is of states."@en1
|
Named graphs describing this resource:
The resource appears as object in 2 triples