Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-04-12-Speech-3-030"
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"en.20000412.2.3-030"2
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".
Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, allow me first of all to make a few brief comments on foreign policy. I would like to encourage the Portuguese Presidency – which so far has managed the negotiations for the Intergovernmental Conference very imaginatively and with a great deal of consideration towards the European Parliament – to give its backing to an extension of the mandate, for example, particularly in the sphere of foreign and security policy, and that of fundamental rights, and to take the decisions necessary to do this in Feira, once we know what is needed on the basis of the implementation of the Helsinki and Cologne Decisions pertaining to foreign and security policy.
However, the crucial test facing this Intergovernmental Conference is to foster the enlargement process by extending majority decisions. Therefore it must be clear that with the exception of constitutional issues, everything should be subject to majority decisions, although of course the Portuguese Presidency and the Commission would be well-advised to draw clear distinctions in their drafts, in areas such as social and taxation policy, between matters which, according to European rules, should be decided on by majority voting, because the internal market requires it, and matters which are to remain subject to unanimous decisions, being the preserve of the nation-state.
This leads me directly on to the matter of the catalogue of competences. This is another task as I see it. We must make it clearer within this European Union who is responsible for what and when. If we were to clearly apportion responsibility in this way, then we would have more transparency and the people would be more willing to give the European Union their support. This is also something the Intergovernmental Conference should strive for, and the proposals to divide the Treaty, the requests to make these distinctions clear, appear to me to be important, also the way in which, for example, the Council is at last bringing transparency and openness to its role as legislator, and we are therefore managing to separate the executive and the legislative. It is all part of the same package.
As to closer cooperation: there will certainly be a need for this in an enlarged Community, particularly where foreign and security policy is concerned. But I would like to make clear where the boundary lies. The boundary is the point at which the unity of the system of laws and the unity of the institution are compromised. That is why we must not push closer cooperation too far. We must not use it as a fallback option because we are unable to extend majority decisions to a sufficient number of areas. I feel that here too, there are certain rules that we need to stick to.
The European Union is a Community of values. Therefore it is to be hoped that the Convention, under the leadership of Roman Herzog, will put forward a catalogue of fundamental rights which we will be able to include in the Treaty in a legally binding manner, and that on this basis, we will then be able to define our values in such a way that many of the things we discussed in the past will no longer be possible, because we will have a clear legal provision in place. If we succeed in this then, all in all, we will have made considerable progress, and will thus have created the conditions necessary to the enlargement of the European Union.
This is where we must truly succeed in bringing about cooperation between the first and second pillars, and also in integrating the second pillar more effectively into the first. In other words, we must bring about closer cooperation between civil and military crisis management. The Treaty of Amsterdam made it possible for there to be far-reaching integration of the Western European Union into the Treaty; in particular, it transferred the Petersberg tasks. I believe there is a need for the European Parliament to be empowered to undertake the necessary parliamentary supervision, so as to create equilibrium between the institutions. I say supervision, not codecision – apart from where budgetary matters are concerned – because this is important if we are to make clear that foreign and security policy are, of course, primarily a task of the executive.
We should also reflect on what is to become of Article 5. In my view, and that of the Committee, it should be included in the Treaty as a protocol, so that any country which so desires can sign up to this protocol on the basis of a free and sovereign decision. I believe that in so doing, we would be able, in the long term, to create a European Union in which there would be no variation in security standards from country to country. This would not be tenable in the long term, in view of the various interests that are represented here.
The European Union is not a State. But it operates as a federal state where it has the authority to do so. That is why relations between the institutions must also be organised along federal lines, and there must be a balance between large and small States. This is certainly one of the difficult tasks facing this Intergovernmental Conference. I can well imagine – and this is also the opinion of my group – that we would be able to work effectively with a Commission containing representatives of all the countries, if the President of the Commission was afforded the opportunity to structure a Commission of this kind in an efficient manner, that is if we were to create such an opportunity by strengthening the position of the President of the Commission here.
However, if we assume that due consideration is being shown towards the small countries, then we must also be in a position to create a stronger basis of legitimacy for the larger countries according to the “one man one vote” principle, and on this basis, adjust the proportional allocation system within the European Parliament, giving certain assurances as to minimum seat numbers, and also settle matters accordingly within the Council."@en1
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