Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-03-17-Speech-5-020"
| Predicate | Value (sorted: default) |
|---|---|
| rdf:type | |
| dcterms:Date | |
| dcterms:Is Part Of | |
| dcterms:Language | |
| lpv:document identification number |
"en.20000317.2.5-020"2
|
| lpv:hasSubsequent | |
| lpv:speaker | |
| lpv:spokenAs | |
| lpv:translated text |
"The European Central Bank’s proposal induces us to reflect and to act prudently on two counts:
Firstly, with regard to the method, it is clear that the procedure remains the same: the Community institutions present truncated reports, which minimise the consequences in terms of further loss of sovereignty for the Member States, and then proceed by means of successive small-scale tinkering.
In this way, when introducing the euro, the Commission maintained that the sovereignty of the Member States was in no way threatened by the ECB, or the ESCB, which was set up to hold and manage Member States’ official foreign reserves. However, they forget that, on the one hand, the national central banks manage these funds on behalf of the ECB, which has sole control of monetary policy. On the other hand, while Article 30(1) of the statutes of the ECB sets the maximum amount for reserve assets at EUR 50 billion, an amount considered sufficient to safeguard the independence of the ECB, two years later, the dogma of independence is looking to Article 30(4) to grant further assets, because it needs to increase its independence and credibility further … It seems legitimate to ask ourselves whether we are throwing funds down a bottomless pit!
Secondly, with regard to the content, the ‘dressing up’ of this new exorbitant demand should not fool us. It is not simply a question of giving more financial resources to an independent institution so that it can apply an effective monetary policy which benefits the Member States, but also of, indirectly, creating additional resources for a technocratic structure so that it may finance its ever greater operational needs.
The issue therefore remains skilfully blurred; while the euro was intended to be ‘strong and stable’ and the reserve assets were originally intended to provide protection during the transitional period (should this prove necessary), it now appears that neither of these expectations has been fulfilled and Frankfurt is totally deadlocked!
Consequently, another question arises regarding the effective use of financial resources. Why should the Member States give up their resources in favour of a Community institution which, as a result of its need to be independent, cannot be controlled?
In conclusion, let us remember that a State is not defined in terms of the sovereignty it enjoys as a result of its autonomy of action. In fact, experience shows that its authority and credibility in the international arena depend very largely on its available resources: we must therefore take care, because to progressively deprive it of both would eventually cause it to cease to exist!"@en1
|
Named graphs describing this resource:
The resource appears as object in 2 triples