Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-03-16-Speech-4-297"
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"en.20000316.11.4-297"2
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"Mr President, the European Central Bank is recommending to the Council that it double its foreign reserve assets. To that end, it puts forward two very different kinds of argument.
The first dwell on its own concerns about financial administration, given that the increase in its staff appears proportional to the fall in income from its assets, income one might in fact have hoped would be sufficient to make it self-supporting.
In a flash of lucidity, the ECB has declared that a central bank with a structural deficit would quite simply not be credible. That is true, and it gives some cause for anxiety about the administrative ability of those who so quickly need to raise the ceiling level.
The second argument is that the ECB needs to enhance its capacity to intervene on the markets in a general context of the depreciation of the euro – contrary to the soothing forecasts we were originally favoured with – and of repeated attacks by the financial centre of one EU Member State which, it has to be said, was wise enough not to join the single currency.
So it did not take long before the supposed instrument of EU independence and economic power so cruelly demonstrated its inadequacies. It is rather shattering to read in the report that, should the political authorities – Parliament and the Council – refuse to help to bring about a structural improvement in the financial position of the ECB, the latter would no longer be regarded as independent by the markets. It is clear to see where the ECB’s priority lies; it has acquired the habit of facing the policy makers with a
and its main aim is to gain the respect of the financial centres, to which it evidently attaches more value than to the confidence of the people.
No, really, we care little whether the ECB does or does not double its nuisance value. We would have preferred some genuine self-criticism on the part of those who are genuinely responsible, namely the governments of the Fifteen, and a policy reversal, which would enable the people of the Member States to free themselves from the fate of standardisation that is being prepared for them by an ill-assorted group made up of technocrats who believe in the divine right of federalism and of globalised speculators.
Mr Goebbels points out that rejection by Parliament could be construed as indicating profound disagreement with the soundness of the policy pursued by the European Central Bank. That is reason enough for us to vote against this text."@en1
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