Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-03-14-Speech-2-213"

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"en.20000314.10.2-213"2
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"Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, in principle, the Commission takes the view that the fishing opportunities granted by a third country under the terms of a fisheries agreement should be utilised in full, and that appropriate mechanisms for transferring under-utilised or non-utilised quotas should be established without jeopardising the principle of relative stability. The Commission would like to point out that the problem of under-utilisation has only arisen in the case of the agreement with Greenland, which is the only agreement to have been concluded in the northern region. However, Mrs Fraga Estévez is surely aware that quite a number of Member States regard any transfer of quotas whatsoever as an attack on the principle of relative stability. That is why, despite all our efforts, the legal mechanisms that come under Community law and that make it possible, in principle, for quotas to be transferred in this way, could not be brought into force yet. Consequently, the Commission takes the view that this tricky issue can only be dealt with as part of a wider and overall examination of the common fisheries policy as a whole. You will be aware that this examination is to take place during the reform of the common fisheries policy. When you talk in terms of an imbalance between the agreements with third countries in the northern hemisphere and those in the southern hemisphere, I feel I must make you aware of the following situation: the Community and the Member States do not pay a licence fee in the case of agreements with third countries in the north because said countries do not ask for one, rather these agreements – with the exception of the agreement with Greenland – are reciprocal, in other words, a fish for a fish, and have no effect whatsoever on the Community budget. Third countries in the Southern Hemisphere, on the other hand, require the Community and shipowners to pay fees. Incidentally, licence fees of this kind were a feature of the bilateral agreements between Spain and third countries even before Spain joined the Community. And so you will appreciate that we are not about to volunteer to include licence fees in the agreements with Greenland and other northern States, when our treaty partners do not require us to do so. Apart from that, other third countries fish in the waters of these northern States and they do not pay licence fees either. Naturally we would want to avoid our fishermen being treated differently to those from third countries who fish in the same waters, but this is exactly what would happen if we were to volunteer to pay licence fees. Another difference between the agreements with countries in the north and those with countries in the south is that the Community’s fishing opportunities under the northern agreements are expressed in terms of total catch size. It works in a different way with the southern agreements. Under these, our opportunities are expressed directly in terms of the number of fishing vessels or even licences. Of course this presents an opportunity to include licences for shipowners in the agreements. And so you will appreciate that there are good reasons as to why we proceed differently with agreements with countries in the north to how we do with agreements with countries in the south."@en1

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