Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-03-01-Speech-3-051"
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"en.20000301.5.3-051"2
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"Mr President, Mr Solana, we are very uneasy about replying to you because, in our view, you are responsible for an area that does not really exist.
We believe that poor old Europe can only speak with one voice to say nothing or, and this is possibly more serious, that it can only resolve its diplomatic contradictions by simply tagging along with American politics. In the lyrical mode of illusion and evasion that they are so fond of, at Sintra, the Fifteen decided to equip themselves with an action force that is ‘pretentiously’ called autonomous. Now, the Union can certainly call the body an ‘action force’ even though for the moment it is only the mobilisation of a few funds and the mustering – on paper – of men, weapons and logistics. But to believe that this muddle can be autonomous is another matter altogether. What interests will this so-called force defend, in view of the fact that the countries of Europe do not have the same interests?
Let us just consider for a moment. What is the basis of armed action? It is the defence of a territory, the protection of a country and in general of interests considered to be vital? Just what is an army in the absence of a home country, in the absence of territory – because Europe is incapable of clearly defining its borders – and in the absence of clearly identified vital interests, which the Fifteen have, for good reason, never dared to discuss. In short, what purpose can an armed force have in the absence of any policy?
We fall back on a kind of ersatz army based on humanitarian rights, a kind of army in the service of vague ideas, of an ideal, the dangers of which have many times been shown in history. A foreign policy presupposes that one has a clear definition of oneself and of one’s own interests. But the CFSP will never be anything else other than a cover for the national interests that already manage to dominate the system. Who cannot see that in this case we are dealing with the twosome formed by London and Berlin, escorted by their respective henchmen, and who have no concept of their own diplomacy as being distinct from that of Washington, seeing themselves at best as bit-part players.
Mr Solana, you yourself are a perfect illustration of this, as it were, structural complicity, passing smoothly from NATO to the CFSP as if they were one and the same. Of course, in reality, they are the same thing. It is still the old imperial service. It is not without some amusement that we have seen you, in your pathetic rivalry with Mr Patten, present this delightful and most charming argument: one day you told a German newspaper, “I am the one that the Americans phone up”. You might have added, Mr Solana, ‘to give me their instructions’, because that is what we see, in fact. In the case of the Balkans, just like everywhere else, one day the United States wants us to destroy the place and the next day they are asking us to rebuild it. Yes, Jean-Claude Martinez was indeed right to interrupt you, Daniel Cohn-Bendit. In every case, it is follow-my-leader syndrome.
Do you think I am going over the top? Every day the news brings more proof of our subservience. Echelon is one of many examples of this, giving an image of Europe that is quite different to the one we like to envisage here. The experts speak of a cultural problem, I think they might be right!"@en1
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