Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-02-16-Speech-3-287"
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"en.20000216.17.3-287"2
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"Mr President, the launch of the euro could well be a heaven-sent opportunity for counterfeiters. The fact is people are suddenly going to lose all their currency references, and that means they will be at serious risk of easily accepting forged euros because they are not very familiar with the genuine article. So the Council is naturally worried and is seeking to establish sanctions, primarily criminal, applicable in all the countries of Europe, against offences of this kind.
No doubt the Council could have been satisfied with a simple resolution recommending that Member States adopt national legislation to that effect. That is what I would have preferred, personally. But, probably through lack of confidence in the zeal of certain members, the Council has preferred to implement a legal instrument which is more binding at European level: a framework decision. Now that is where the difficulties begin, because criminal law comes under national sovereignty and the Treaty of Maastricht contains no specific provision covering this situation for the euro – so as not to frighten the voters by over-egging the pudding.
The draft framework decision before us today tries to cover up this lacuna by referring to Articles 31 and 34(2)(b) of the Treaty. However, I find these passports inadequate. Article 31 only envisages minimum common rules for criminal acts in certain cases, specifically restricted to organised crime, terrorism and drug trafficking. Counterfeiting is not on the list. Article 34, a product of the Treaty of Amsterdam, only lays down the new form of a framework decision, and clearly this only applies to the existing powers of the European Union. So we come back to the previous problem. In other words, the Council has not succeeded in giving this text a credible legal basis. In a way, this is deferred punishment for its lack of honesty, at the time, in presenting the Maastricht Treaty to the voters.
I would also like to make a more general point. Not so long ago we were dealing with one or more reports on questions of principle relating to the euro in virtually every part-session. But there has been nothing for a year. Just a few little technical reports like this one on counterfeiting. The Commission’s communication on its strategic objectives for 2000-2005, which we have debated this week, contained absolutely nothing on this vast subject, except the reminder, in a single line, that the euro coins and notes are due to come into circulation on 1 January 2002.
However, there are many underlying problems yet to be resolved. Let us mention, for example, the disturbing lack of public interest, the definition of monetary policy objectives abusively reduced to the mere fight against inflation, the strange coupling of monetary federalism to a lack budgetary or fiscal federalism, the status of the present applicant countries, when they become members, vis-à-vis the euro zone, the confused reaction of the international markets to this currency with no homogeneous popular foundation, and so on. Do I also need to mention that investors who sold dollars to buy euros have lost 20% since 1 January 1999, 40% if they bought bonds, and no less than 55% if they sold yen to buy euros? Mr President, for those unfortunate investors even real euros are false money. These are gigantic problems but they seem to be taboo here."@en1
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