Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-02-02-Speech-3-084"

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"en.20000202.6.3-084"2
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"Mr President, the draft resolution we are now discussing requires, precisely as before, that the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference should have a broad agenda involving radical reforms of the institutions. The forthcoming enlargement of the Union is used as an argument for this. I am convinced that this is an error of judgement. A federal and centralist EU which intervenes more and more in the government of the Member States is in actual fact less well placed for enlargement. A flexible EU which concentrates on fewer but important areas and which respects national differences and national democracy has a better chance of embracing a significantly greater number of countries. Paragraph D of the draft resolution requires a more coordinated and more open economic policy at EU level. It is not, however, possible to talk about this without at the same time talking about monetary union. This text says nothing about the major democratic and political problems involving monetary union and the European Central Bank. This is untenable. If there is a desire to make the EU more democratic, the whole construction of EMU must be reconsidered. The Central Bank must be placed under political control so that the direction to be taken by monetary policy may be governed by political objectives such as high employment and prosperity. Public control of the Central Bank must be improved if this is to become possible. The rigid and unsuccessful monetarism of the Stability Pact must be re-examined and discarded so that we might have a uniform policy which has prosperity as its primary objective. Article 56 of the Treaty, prohibiting currency speculation or any interference in the free movement of capital, must be removed so that damaging currency speculation may be checked by means of political control. In the majority of EU countries, there are now governments dominated by social democrats. It is remarkable that, now they have the opportunity to do so, none of them is demanding any change in the direction taken by monetary union. It also, of course, damages credibility when it is stated that monetary union could constitute a counterbalance to globalised capital. The resolution requires the European Parliament to have increased influence over the Intergovernmental Conference. It is, however, important to emphasise that the Intergovernmental Conference is and will remain a conference of the Member States. It is the Member States’ parliaments, or people voting in referenda, who are to direct the development of the Treaty. It is therefore out of the question that the European Parliament should be given any formal influence over the negotiation process or over ratification."@en1

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