Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-01-20-Speech-4-077"
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"en.20000120.5.4-077"2
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"The problem of the storms that have affected various European countries shows the vulnerability of our society, otherwise characterised by its economic and technological development. We realise that we are not shielded from the dreadful consequences that can be caused by climatic disasters such as floods, earthquakes or tidal waves. Some countries have been able to provide a solution to the problem of compensating the victims of such events. France is one of these, but it is a large country with considerable resources. This is not the case in smaller countries.
In Belgium, a scheme to compensate the victims of natural disasters has been in preparation for 10 years. It is at European level that the various schemes have encountered problems. First of all, whereas, before the internal market was established, it was possible to impose prices and exemptions, this is no longer the case and that seems to me quite natural. On the other hand, it is more difficult to accept that it is not possible to make provision for the creation of a mutual reinsurance fund with which the companies operating on the Belgian market would be obliged to insure themselves. Then the guarantee of the State could come into play only if the system had exhausted all its funds (in the event of a major disaster).
Now we have a priority: to offer disaster victims a full, unlimited, guarantee. Fate has already dealt them a cruel hand without them being responsible, so should they be disadvantaged further by inadequate insurance cover? Here, the guarantee of the State is essential, as no traditional reinsurer offers unlimited conditions. This is the only way to maintain a reasonable price for the consumer.
The appeal to traditional reinsurance will have a regulatory effect at international level, which means that insured parties in Belgium will pay for the hurricanes somewhere in Central America. The idea is not to undo the effects of solidarity, but to organise a fair system that is protected from market forces alone.
I would add that it is the only way for the State to have a guarantee that the system acts in the general interest, by keeping an eye on the build up and use of the technical reserves. If this “right of inspection” is not authorised, the State will never agree to give its guarantee. A controlled reinsurance mechanism is the only thing that will make it possible to avoid risks being selected by the natural laws of the market.
If a national solidarity mechanism is not guaranteed by a system that departs, even temporarily, from the laws of the market, bad risks will be excluded, whereas it is precisely those risks that we are trying to protect (for example, houses built on river banks). That is why I raise the issue of a derogation from European law, from the standard law of competition. It is, moreover, a concept that is in accordance with the Treaty. Article 87(2) authorises State aid “to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences.”
It is far from unlikely that such disasters will recur. Solutions should be found to finance the compensation of victims of natural disasters. A departure from the law of competition, temporarily, would form a hope of resolving this harrowing problem in a country like Belgium."@en1
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