Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-01-20-Speech-4-033"
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"en.20000120.3.4-033"2
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"To put this debate into perspective, let us remember that the current MAGP, the fourth generation, falls far short of the scientific advice provided by the Lassen committee. They recommended deep cuts in the EU's fleets to allow stocks to recover. The Council could not accept that so the final regulation calls for relatively modest cuts. Thus, the combined EU fleet is only supposed to reduce by 2.3% in terms of tonnage and 3% in power during the five years of the programme.
As the Commission's report shows, by the beginning of 1998, after only one year of the programme, the aggregate EU fleets were already far below these targets. Rather than showing how good the Member States have been, what this actually shows is that the required reductions were very modest indeed and far less than was necessary. Nonetheless, and this is the point of real contention, many Member States have not abided by the regulation and many of the fleets are too large. What does one do with these Member States who place themselves above Community law and ignore their obligations?
The Commission has proposed several things: it can withhold structural funds, but that is only a valid tool if the Member States actually utilise the funds. It can take Member States to court but that is time-consuming, expensive and difficult. In its proposal for the recent renewal of the FIFG, the Commission suggested that non-complying Member States should be denied access to permits to fish under thirdÂcountry fishing agreements. Predictably, the Council refused.
Some means must be found that will be effective to persuade or force Member States to respect their legal obligations. Mr Cunha asked the Commission to consider the possibility of quota sanctions if the MAGP objectives were not respected. Some consider this to be in breach of the principle of relative stability, but let us remember that relative stability is only one principle in the common fisheries policy. The basic regulation also says that Community management systems must enable a balance to be created on a permanent basis between resources and exploitation. In other words, if the stocks all crash, relative stability of a zero quota is not worth an awful lot.
We think that the idea at least deserves serious consideration. There is already a precedent in Regulation 847/96 on the multiannual TACs. Under that regulation, if a Member State exceeds its quota in certain fisheries, its quota the following year is reduced, not just for the amount of over-fishing, but by an additional amount which increases, the greater the amount of over-fishing that has taken place.
This is clearly a penalty but it was not viewed as being in breach of relative stability. Perhaps Mr Cunha's suggestion could have been a little more carefully worded to make it clear that any reduction would not be permanent but of a limited duration, and that is why we will support the amendment by the PSE on this point to include "temporary". I am sure everyone will agree that some way must be found to ensure that Member States follow the law."@en1
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