Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-01-19-Speech-3-220"

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"Madam President, Commissioner, I should like once again to say a few words on the and the ideological tactics behind this oral question. Also because I know how many social democrats in this House share our criticism, and not just the economic and financial policy experts. We know what the problem is: instability on the markets as the result of speculation. But the people asking the question need to know that not every instance of instability, as the Commissioner has just so impressively told us, is the result of speculation. The Tobin tax would not have been able to prevent the crises in the EEA in 1992 and 1993 or the crises in the south-east Asian currencies in 1997. The initiators of this question do not propose a solution; instead they are calling for a new burden, they are calling for more bureaucracy, for a measure which runs counter to the market mechanisms and they are taking up plenary’s time with an intergroup opinion which excludes the competent parliamentary committee, contrary to several resolutions by Parliament. In my view, and I say this quite clearly, the question is ideologically motivated rather than solution-focused. I consider this to be the wrong way forward for several reasons. Why do we reject the Tobin tax and consider it so questionable? First, and the Commissioner has also confirmed this, because it places a heavy burden on the capital markets. Even a small tax would have serious repercussions on the capital markets, because this sort of speculation tax would reduce the profitability of investments considerably. In addition, this sort of measure would also seriously hamper the development of the financial markets and would stand in the way of the principle of the free movement of capital, which is one of the central tenets of the internal market. Secondly, speculative capital is extremely difficult to identify. Thirdly, unless they are introduced in all countries at the same time, tax measures are easy to circumvent because there are otherwise too many loopholes. Fourthly, technically speaking, this measure is highly impracticable and will result in a great deal of bureaucracy and administration and be impossible to control. The measure which we should be taking is part of the resolution before us here today. We need stronger banking supervision. We need to clarify the liability for transactions. We need a framework of regulations at international level. We need to examine national laws in order to check that they comply with the rules of the Basle committee and how the dissemination of these rules can be stepped up. I have a serious problem with one of the central points of this resolution which we cannot accept as it stands. I refer to point 9. Having listened to the Commissioner just now, we know that the Commission’s knowledge of the facts will result in a ‘no’ to the Tobin tax. If the knowledge of the facts and this debate and the arguments are as we say, and I think that they are right, then to take up another six months of the Commission’s time and occasion uncertainty on the financial and capital markets would be irresponsible. The capital markets do not want uncertainty from us, they want clarity; which is why we reject point 9 and call for a split vote."@en1

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