Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/1999-12-14-Speech-2-086"
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"en.19991214.5.2-086"2
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".
Mr President, Madam President-in-Office of the Council, we find ourselves in a truly strange, a truly curious situation. We voted on the first reading three months ago. We negotiated assiduously in the various fora. The Commission produced its rectifying letter, the Council voted for the budget at its second reading and the Committee on Budgets last week adopted its own second reading.
Finally, our fourth objective: we wanted the measures undertaken on behalf of the Balkans to be based on a serious, multiannual and binding estimate of needs. In that respect, we are far short of the target. It was indeed sufficient to hear the speech of the President-in-Office of the Council just now. She had a fear and dread of quoting figures and was speaking a language which seemed to have gone through some double translation process, ensuring that no one could understand a word in the end.
But in any case, this dancing around the figures spoke volumes and indicated that we are in fact building on a rather unsatisfactory foundation. The estimates are not serious ones. We have gone from EUR 500 million, a figure adopted chiefly for the number of zeros in it and its ease of pronunciation. Next, everyone, except ourselves, started making estimates, saying: let us take away EUR 140 million, put humanitarian aid to one side, add the accounts, etc, and suddenly coming up with the figures required. The fact is there has been no serious estimate of needs founded on a clear distinction between the measures necessary for the repair of war damage, for the modernisation of the country and for the modernisation of its society.
We were awaiting serious commitments, multiannual commitments, binding commitments. In this respect, the compromise is not satisfactory, in my opinion, if not in the opinion of all the members of the Committee on Budgets. Finally, the terms of the compromise were for a moderate reduction of payment appropriations. If we had had recourse to Article 272, then we should have had to make savings of 2.8 billion from the non-compulsory expenditure. Obviously, this was the reason we rejected this prospect, so as not to make cuts as extensive as this.
Such were the terms of the compromise. To assess the results, we are satisfied on two counts. We are only partly satisfied as to the review, not satisfied at all regarding the estimate of needs in Kosovo, and may or may not be satisfied regarding the reduction of payment appropriations, a matter on which I hope you will change position.
What are we going to do now? What is our scenario? In my opinion, the compromise is not acceptable, chiefly due to the inadequate estimates for Kosovo, which mean that we are acting irresponsibly, squandering taxpayers’ money. This is why, as far as I am concerned, whatever the decision of the Committee on Budgets, if we were to go once again to a compromise, then I should abstain on this budget. As far as my fellow committee members are concerned, the main thing is to reduce payment appropriations. Will it be done? Will you do it? I have no idea. We shall see what you are prepared to say shortly.
What we voted on within the Committee on Budgets, and what we have proposed to you, is simple. Firstly, we shall not resort to Article 272, to prevent our strangulation on the matter of payment. Secondly, we shall take category 4 up to the maximum limit. Without financing Kosovo, except in the amount of EUR 115 million, by adding the accounts which are presented, i.e. with Mr Mingasson and Mrs Schreyer acting as treasurer, on a monthly basis. We are acting as treasurer for Kosovo, on a monthly basis we are giving them the means to pay for the things they have to have done and we are awaiting a serious, overall estimate of needs in Kosovo and in the Balkans. And then we reconvene together with the Council and the Commission to finally discuss the key issues, i.e. a satisfactory estimate for Kosovo, an overall estimate for the Balkans and then a review of the financial perspectives, a satisfactory estimate for the Balkans. This is what we are doing. It is not a war plan, it is a plan for cooperation. We need another three months to be able to get estimates which are satisfactory onto the table, and then we shall reconvene.
This is the scenario we envisage. Madam, do not take it as a declaration of war, but if you respond to our vote in the same way that the Marquise de Merteuil responded to the Vicomte de Valmont in “Dangerous Liaisons”, well then, this war is not one that we would wish but it is one that we would see through. In that case we would have recourse to Article 272 on reasonable grounds regarding 2001. But this is not the scenario we envisage. We are offering you a scenario of cooperation with an agreement which has been postponed for a few months, and in any case with the certainty, for the Commission, that Kosovo will receive the necessary financial aid. Thank you, Mr President, for your indulgence.
All the discussions should have been completed. We were supposed to proceed to the vote on Thursday but, apparently, now that everything is ready to go ahead, the Council is continually determining its position. I say “determining its position” but this is really just an expression, as in fact it is changing it imperceptibly. This is in the domain of what Jean Paulhan, the noted French writer, used to call “Progress in Love on the Slow Side”, the title of a very interesting book which I recommend. Progress in these matters is on the slow side, apparently, and still remains to be completed. We are waiting for progress with an impatience which is becoming truly alarming, for we do not understand why the Council has, for weeks, been incapable of saying clearly exactly what it is prepared to accept or not.
We see this prevarication as the evidence of the increasing worrying paralysis of this institution, witness the report I made last year on the operational problems of the Council. We experienced this in some conciliation meetings which were considered highly traumatic by the majority of my fellow Members, less seasoned in battle than Mr Wynn, myself or Mr Colom i Naval, who are familiar with this type of thing and who know it is never very easy. The fact is, the conciliation procedure has been extremely tough and, Madam President-in-Office of the Council, you yourself adopted some overly rash positions.
So, what is the position? I have no idea! This evening a three-way dialogue is to take place. Will you be making proposals to us? I do not see how you can make proposals today if you were unable to make them yesterday, or last Wednesday, or a fortnight ago, but perhaps you possess the secret of modifying the views of your members?
In this context, what is the position of Parliament? What are we looking to achieve through the compromise? Well, we are after five things. Firstly, the second reading vote should be as close as possible to the first reading vote in Parliament. Our vote reflected our political orientation. What is the state of play? The various scenarios in this regard are satisfactory. In the initial phase of the procedure, we received a proposal for a reduction of approximately EUR 500 million from category 4 in relation to the preliminary draft budget. In the compromise we voted on, we have a reduction of only EUR 150 million, not in relation to the PDB but in relation to our vote at first reading. As far as the remainder is concerned, i.e. categories 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7, nothing has been changed. One might safely say that Parliament has been satisfied on this point, subject of course to resolution of the Kosovo issue, which I shall return to.
As the President-in-Office of the Council mentioned, the major commitments which we had, regarding the Fisheries Agreement, Timor and Turkey, have also been taken into consideration, which, again, is satisfactory.
Our second objective was to have Kosovo financed at a level above the ceiling of heading 4. As it happens, after a difficult beginning, we consider that the proposal to use the flexibility clause, although not the most suitable instrument, intended to provide financial aid for Kosovo of EUR 200 million above the category is satisfactory in itself, and indeed enables us, if we are in agreement as to the remainder, to have a satisfactory approach to providing financial aid for Kosovo for the year concerned. I note, moreover, that the final proposal is even higher than the initial proposals of the Commission, which it should be aware of.
Our third objective was the review of the financial perspectives beyond the financial year 2000. Our success in this respect has been much more limited and, in my opinion, extremely uncertain. We have here a commitment which has two negative aspects in relation to what we actually wanted: firstly, the review is to concern just the Balkans as a whole, whereas we consider that it is the Kosovo issue which justifies it and, secondly, this commitment is a conditional one. The amounts of the appropriations allocated to the Balkans, resulting from the estimates made by the Commission and accepted by the Council, should be markedly higher than those in existing programmes.
I am afraid that in fact, in the mind of the Council, review of the financial perspectives might be centred on the disappearance of Comrade Milosevic. I find this point of view worrying for, when I see what has happened to Saddam Hussein, I think that dictators sometimes have a longer lifetime than might be desirable. So, the question remains."@en1
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