Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/1999-11-18-Speech-4-154"
| Predicate | Value (sorted: default) |
|---|---|
| rdf:type | |
| dcterms:Date | |
| dcterms:Is Part Of | |
| dcterms:Language | |
| lpv:document identification number |
"en.19991118.7.4-154"2
|
| lpv:hasSubsequent | |
| lpv:speaker | |
| lpv:spokenAs | |
| lpv:translated text |
"In our view, the preparations for the forthcoming round of international trade negotiations is not at all satisfactory as regards procedure, and this is due to at least three reasons.
Firstly, we can see the European Union weakening its own position, according to the familiar process, by means of its internal discussions, even before the start of negotiations. For example, the final mandate granted by the Council on 22 October, makes no mention of defending the principle of Community preference, a principle which had however been adopted by the Agriculture Council of the 27 September, which was itself only partly satisfactory since it omitted the principle of Europe’s autonomy in terms of foodstuffs. We come down a notch at every stage. There are many more possible examples. Thus, regarding our preference system for importing bananas from overseas, the Commission has just made proposals which meet with American demands even before the opening of the Seattle Conference. In every field, one might say that the internal concessions made in order to arrive at a unified European position, declared beforehand to be desirable, are leading us to reduce our claims even before starting discussions with our competitors.
Secondly, the Commission was given a comprehensive negotiation mandate on a whole series of issues, some of which come under Community jurisdiction, but others, such as services or investment, which are clearly in the remit of national authorities. Admittedly, it is a mandate for the framing of negotiations and not for the consequences of these negotiations. Nonetheless, the Council, without explicitly saying so, has just set in train a process which may lead it, if it is not stopped, to an absolute negotiating mandate being granted to the Commission and thus, in application of the new Article 133(5) of the Treaty of Amsterdam, to the ultimate power of ratification being taken away from the national parliaments, but still without clearly declaring this, obviously. We are currently drifting off our course in the fog, without knowing exactly at what point we are going to go over the edge. Then we will be told that it is too late. Such methods are perfectly reprehensible.
Thirdly, despite our requests, we note that the Seattle negotiations are going to be undertaken before a clear, specific and comprehensive report has been made of the consequences of the Uruguay Round. There too we shall be advancing in the dark. The Commission did, admittedly, give in on one point, since it is going to proceed to the evaluation of the impact on sustainability, as I was saying, i.e. on the environmental consequences of liberalisation. That is all very well. But this study should have been carried out on many other points, such as the impact of liberalisation, in its current form, on the preservation of cultural and social models.
For these three reasons, in these circumstances, we are unable to approve the opening of the Seattle negotiations."@en1
|
Named graphs describing this resource:
The resource appears as object in 2 triples