Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/1999-11-17-Speech-3-137"

Predicate	Value (sorted: default)
rdf:type	lpv_eu:Speech2
dcterms:Date	"1999-11-17"^^xsd:date2
dcterms:Is Part Of	lp_eu:Situation in Chechnya2
dcterms:Language	"nl"^^xsd:language2
lpv:document identification number	"en.19991117.5.3-137"2
lpv:hasSubsequent	lp_eu:1999-11-17-Speech-3-1382
lpv:speaker	lp:Bas Belder2
lpv:spokenAs	member; EDD (1999-07-20--2004-07-19)3 unknown; Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij - Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond - Reformatorisch Politieke Federatie (1999-07-20--2002-03-17)3 member; Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy (1999-07-21--2002-01-14)3 vice-chair; Delegation for relations with the United States (1999-07-22--2002-01-14)3 substitute; Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy (1999-07-21--2002-01-14)3
lpv:translated text	"Mr President, why is President Yeltsin now repeating what he once described as the biggest blunder of his political career of 1994/1996: a large-scale military intervention in Chechnya? And why does the Russian military apparatus provoke the Trans-Caucasian republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan by making wild accusations regarding cooperation with Chechen “separatists and terrorists”? Both operations are pretty disastrous anyway, both for the Russian Federation and the Caucasus. Under the quasi-legitimate banner of “fighting terrorism and violent separatism”, the Kremlin is itself terrorising the Chechen people and is stimulating the very terrorist, fundamentalist elements amongst them. It is likely that the Russian punitive expedition in Chechnya is largely founded on internal political and military motives other than the purging of “Chechen Wahabi headhunters”. To the fraudulent “family” of President Yeltsin, this is a true gift by way of a diversionary tactic. At the same time, the deeply aggrieved Russian army leadership can undertake bloody revenge for the humiliating defeat against the Chechen freedom fighters of only a few years ago. Moreover, the horrifying war scene in the Caucasus offers the average Russian politician the chance par excellence to beat the popular national drum, especially in the run-up to the Duma elections. The trouble-stirring from Moscow in the Caucasus is undoubtedly the result of the competitive rivalry with the West regarding the energy treasures of the Caspian Basin and is indicative of a revival of the imperial idea. In this light, the Chechen tragedy is merely the overture for a larger, regional crisis. Does Moscow have as little to fear from the West, including the European Union, now, as it did during the first, degrading showdown with Grozny? Why not block all credit to Russia, for example?!"@en1

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