Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/1999-11-17-Speech-3-024"
Predicate | Value (sorted: default) |
---|---|
rdf:type | |
dcterms:Date | |
dcterms:Is Part Of | |
dcterms:Language | |
lpv:document identification number |
"en.19991117.2.3-024"2
|
lpv:hasSubsequent | |
lpv:speaker | |
lpv:spokenAs | |
lpv:translated text |
"Madam President, Mr Solana, Commissioner, I believe the crisis in Kosovo showed, among other things, that international crisis management cannot be left to NATO alone in the world of the twenty-first century. In fact, the leading role played by the United States is not as unproblematic as some might think. It was found in Kosovo that military personnel can sometimes be wiser and more realistic than politicians, so we need not necessarily fear military personnel. On behalf of the Greens/European Free Alliance Group, I would say that the majority of our Group seem to have come to accept that the European Union could develop common crisis management strategies but we want to impose clear conditions and frameworks for this.
Firstly, foreign policy must be consistent; its different aspects must form a coherent whole that leads us in the same, and not different, directions. Foreign policy must also be open. Mr Solana, I have to mention that I have personally fought against the Security Council, of which you are leader, in court for more than two years, using non-military means, to obtain a certain document which concerns compliance on the part of Member States with criteria relating to the export of weapons. I hope that you will increase transparency in the work of the Council in foreign policy also.
Another condition that is very important is that the management of civil crises must be improved markedly. What you said is quite right: progress has been made in this area during the Finnish Presidency. Keep the two operations together. It is not necessarily a good thing to divide the tasks, with the High Representative taking responsibility for military crisis management and the member of the Commission for civil crisis management. They have to be kept together.
Thirdly, we want to lay down the condition that each operation must be independent from the others, and decisions on it must be able to be taken separately. The Member States must be able to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether they should become involved in these operations. The criteria must naturally be the same for all. We cannot accept a situation where different criteria have been applied in Kosovo and in Chechnya, for example.
Finally, the main question here is how relations between the European Union and NATO will develop. Eleven of the present Member States belong to NATO, but four do not. We have to avoid a situation where the European Union is becoming an actual pillar of NATO in Europe. It is important that NATO and the European Union remain, in reality, distinct from one another. Such an asymmetric structure can help promote peace in the world. It does not imply weakness; it may also be a resource."@en1
|
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata |
Named graphs describing this resource:
The resource appears as object in 2 triples