Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/1999-10-27-Speech-3-173"
Predicate | Value (sorted: default) |
---|---|
rdf:type | |
dcterms:Date | |
dcterms:Is Part Of | |
dcterms:Language | |
lpv:document identification number |
"en.19991027.6.3-173"2
|
lpv:hasSubsequent | |
lpv:speaker | |
lpv:spokenAs | |
lpv:translated text |
"Mr President, Mr Sasi, Commissioner, you have just reminded us, in great detail, of the importance of this Treaty Ban, the basic aim of which is to strengthen the measures of the non-proliferation treaty and, in conjunction with this, aims to keep the development of nuclear weapons under control, thereby limiting the proliferation of these weapons and of the technology necessary for developing them.
As you pointed out, the treaty was established three years ago and was signed straight away by the five nuclear powers which are the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. But, in order for it to come into force, it must be ratified by forty-four specifically designated States amongst which there are the states that actually have nuclear capability, and the nuclear powers, but also those States known as “threshold States”, which are States that, because they have nuclear reactors in the civilian sector, are capable of developing military technology.
On 13 October, this treaty was defeated in the American Senate, which rejected it by 51 votes to 48 and one abstention. This shows that the margin was very narrow and that it may therefore be useful – and it certainly will be useful – for our Parliament to make its voice heard after those of the Heads of government who, in Tampere, lamented the attitude of the American Senate, pointing out that it represented a timely signal to those who might be tempted to equip themselves with nuclear weapons.
Among the arguments put forward in the United States, some people thought that it was not yet time to stop nuclear testing at a time when North Korea is making efforts to develop its own weapons, and as China is continuing to build up its arsenal. Others questioned the validity of simulation and felt that in order to ensure the long-term credibility of nuclear deterrence, they should not prohibit themselves going ahead with testing. Finally, others questioned the application of this treaty which, it must be admitted, will be difficult to control even when the 381 monitoring stations that the Representative of the Council told us about have actually been deployed. There is no guarantee in the short term that they have the necessary means to detect weak nuclear explosions in an environment which does not always make it possible to tell them apart from earthquakes.
All of that is of little consequence, however, in terms of the geopolitical challenge that confront us, consisting of monitoring as efficiently as possible the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction. I am pleased that Commissioner Patten mentioned the fact that the threat does not come from nuclear weapons alone. Having dedicated my life to the use of weapons, I know that force is in itself neutral, and that it is the way it is used that can be good or bad. The advent of nuclear weapons has at least had the merit of forcing political leaders to take stock of the risks that their jobs may entail. It was probably the balance of terror throughout the forty years of the cold war which allowed us to avoid a third world war. The strategy of deterrence may therefore have its merits.
If we do not manage to ban the proliferation of these weapons, we run the risk that they will end up falling into irresponsible hands. This is why, aware of this risk, I am approving the resolution which will be submitted tomorrow for Parliament’s approval."@en1
|
Named graphs describing this resource:
The resource appears as object in 2 triples