Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/1999-10-27-Speech-3-148"
Predicate | Value (sorted: default) |
---|---|
rdf:type | |
dcterms:Date | |
dcterms:Is Part Of | |
dcterms:Language | |
lpv:document identification number |
"en.19991027.5.3-148"2
|
lpv:hasSubsequent | |
lpv:speaker | |
lpv:spokenAs | |
lpv:translated text |
"Mr President, I would like to thank Commissioner Diamantopoulou for her speech. For my Group, the Union for a Europe of Nations, the context of this matter is rather delicate because there is the danger, on the one hand, of setting the premises for restricted competition and, on the other hand, limiting the actions of the Member States in this field, and this conflicts with the principle of subsidiarity. So a real principle that would justify the Union’s intervention here is the possibility of social discomfort that the restructuring of firms could cause within the Community and within the Member States as a whole. It is, moreover, a principle which is already provided for by the Treaty of Rome of 1957. And this is to prevent future Union policies intended to increase cohesion and social integration being rendered, even only partly, useless.
Given the hope that the Union will have a joint economic policy and, possibly, a joint industrial policy, in our opinion it seems appropriate in the meantime for the Union to give its opinion, especially on those restructurings which the Member States have been or are involved in, financially or otherwise. Moreover, we must stress the requirement for the Union to subject its interventions in this area to more stringent control and some checking mechanisms, both as regards the involvement with – and in any case, the information given to – trade union representatives, and also as regards the actual positive results – not just economic but also social results – of the interventions themselves. Union aid to firms has not always resulted in stable growth in the firms or protection of their employment levels.
In these cases, we have to ask for a broad sanction to be implemented until the amounts committed by the Union itself have been completely reimbursed. This principle must also be applied in the event that aid is given to a non-Community firm, when it is considered that a cooperation agreement with the firm’s country – if one does not already exist – might not only better formulate and integrate the Union’s interventions regarding that country, but in this desirable event it could facilitate the implementation of the above-mentioned sanction."@en1
|
Named graphs describing this resource:
The resource appears as object in 2 triples