Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/1999-10-26-Speech-2-115"
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"en.19991026.3.2-115"2
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"Our meeting today is certainly a landmark. We have had so little to rejoice about as regards the building of Europe, so the fact that we are coming to the end of a successful year as regards the euro is something we should applaud. I believe that both Mr Duisenberg and Mr Lamfalussy and their colleagues deserve all our gratitude for everything they have achieved in this matter. Of course, in all democratically-held debates such as this, we are bound to hear at least some critical remarks – but that does not, in any way, suggest that we do not acknowledge the tremendous contribution the European Central Bank has made to European affairs.
Mr President, since we are discussing the annual report, it would be a good idea to focus our attention on a number of long-term issues. The first is the ECB’s insistence on the two-pillar strategy for ensuring monetary stability. While using a “broad-based assessment of the outlook for price developments”, as the Bank calls it, which is basically an “inflation forecast”, seems perfectly logical, using the M3 money supply has neither practical nor theoretical support. From what I have seen, I believe Mr Titmeier has also criticised this. It is an important issue since there may be some disparity between the two criteria and it would be tragic to curb the development of Europe for the sake of an indicator of somewhat dubious quality. Even if monetary policy is as advantageous as you say it is, Mr Duisenberg, and we have no proof of this yet, monetary ‘over-stability’ could prove to be extremely detrimental.
The second point concerns the independence of the Central Bank, which the political leaders of Europe have given their assurances of – and rightly so. However, independence from the political leadership is not enough; the European Central Bank must convince us that it can guarantee its independence from the capital markets. The central banks are often tempted to keep up with the markets; to wit, they are often tempted to adhere to the interest rates which the markets fix indirectly when they set the prices of securities. But the markets have short-term horizons, the markets have a mass mentality and are exceptionally prone to speculative bubbles which can be particularly disastrous at times. The European Central Bank has not yet said anything to us about that. We only hear a deafening silence from your report. And so, you will have to make a concerted effort to convince us that, in additional to political independence, you have also gained independence from the capital markets so that we can support you in absolute confidence."@en1
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