Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/1999-07-21-Speech-3-037"

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"(DE) Mr President, I would like to comment briefly on what has been said here before I leave on a trip to Turkey. I would like to thank all those who sang our praises and who gave us their support, and I would also like to answer some criticisms. Something that we never promised, and there was no way on earth that this could be done, was that in these last six months we could resolve every problem facing the European Union, problems which I too have dearly wanted to see resolved for some time. ....., that this is a result of the concerted efforts of the European Member States, of the European Union. We should not forget this. Let me tell you, I was in Bosnia, I saw the mass graves and I will not forget them as long as I live. It is our duty to complete the process of European integration, and this means peace, security and democracy for everyone on this continent. This requires our determination to oppose those who seek to carry out nationalist policies through violence, murder, terror and expulsion, and when all other means fail, to resort to military means if necessary. This integrated Europe must not accept nationalism. (Applause) That is the most important point, although it was not included in the plans for our Presidency of the Council, because it gives a very strong message about the future of the European Union. I am firmly convinced that in essence, this must go hand in hand with progress towards integration, and above all with the process for further democratisation. This will be a very complex and complicated debate, but we must start this debate, which in France is summed up under the heading ‘Culmination of European Union’, and it will continue for a long time. Where do the outer borders of the European Union lie? What does the make-up of its constitution look like? What is the relationship between the European Union and its Member States, and the relationship between the institutions themselves? What will the future role of the Parliament be and how can its powers be strengthened? These are all questions which will relate directly to enlargement, because we can already see what heavy weather a Union of fifteen Members makes of things. If enlargement occurs, the question of the Union"s ability to act will be absolutely central. This is the essence of the next great challenge; common security and foreign policy, deepening and, ultimately, enlargement. I have a message for all those who speak in favour of a preventative peace policy, and there is a broad consensus in the national parliaments as well as in the European Parliament, in spite of all the things Dayton failed to deliver, and that is not a criticism of Dayton as presumably it couldn"t have been any other way at the time, and that message is that a strategy which will be effective in the long-term for bringing South-Eastern Europe up to the level of an integrated Europe and then bringing it into an integrated Europe, has now become a functioning policy. Life must now be breathed into the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. Money is not the first and foremost issue here, for the issue is one of decisions about structures. We must bring about confidence there and we must establish a free trade area there. Trade and change must replace national aggressions and the necessary means must be put in place to achieve this. So I appeal to all of you who have spoken here in favour of a preventative peace policy, to fight for the long-term success of the Stability Pact, because that would indeed be drawing the right conclusions from the war in Kosovo, the Yugoslavian wars of succession. I would like once again to thank everyone, Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, for your support during the German Presidency, and I wish you, the new Parliament, all the best, as I do the coming new Commission, once they have survived the difficult hearings. These are the Commissioners who have yet to be appointed in the torture chambers, and I mean this ironically and, of course, only in a rhetorical sense, of the freely-elected European Parliament. All the best! I would also like, if you would permit me to, to make a parting request of you, and in particular of the new majority: we should discuss national politics at a national level and argue intensely about them, and come to blows, but it is European politics that should be discussed at the European level, and this House should always uphold the subtle differences! (Applause) On criticism of the institutional reforms; we tried to make progress with the institutional reforms, and when I made my maiden speech as Germany took over the Council Presidency, it was still not at all clear whether we would actually receive support for an Intergovernmental Conference. I am glad that it was possible to push this through. I see this as an important step forwards. But this is where the critics got themselves into a terrible muddle, and sometimes, all logic went out of the window. To my colleague in the PDS who, on the one hand, criticised us for ignoring French sensibilities and also the aims of French politics and yet, at the same time, heavily criticised the inadequacy of the compromise on the agricultural commodities market that was worked out at the Berlin Summit, I can only say that these things go hand in hand, and you should look more closely at whether you have not, as it were, ended up getting yourself entangled in a knot of contradictions. It will become clear to you in the weeks and months to come that these things are very closely linked. I would like to say to those of you who are talking of the militarisation of the European Union, and this is an important point, keep your illusions. This would mean that in the areas of security and foreign policy, Europe would not be in a position to determine its own fate, that is, to follow its own path. During the war in Kosovo, I experienced just how much weight Europe can bring to bear in terms of possibilities for shaping situation by political means, and in terms of possibilities for pursuing a preventative foreign policy, a preventative peace policy, and for resolving a conflict when the conflict has worsened. I can only say that Europe must come together, also in terms of its security and foreign policy, otherwise decisions will be taken elsewhere. Here in the European Parliament or perhaps in any one of the Member States, it may be easy to sit back and allow oneself the illusion that we are not affected by such decisions. The reality is that these decisions are taken under completely different conditions and in a completely different place. This is exactly what I do not want, and I believe it to be a development in the wrong direction. (Applause) The euro is showing that there are differing views on Europe, and we should not pretend otherwise. It is quite obvious that there are. My view is that of a convinced integrationist and I would like to see Europe become an entity which has the power to act politically, because there are two reasons which convince me that it will not work in any other way. The first reason is that in this age of globalisation, it will only be possible to maintain the European nation-state and that which we value and wish to preserve about the European nation-state, if Europe unites, because the magnitude of the traditional nation-state will only be able, in the conditions created by globalisation, to guarantee peace, security, prosperity and democracy for its citizens as part of an integrated Europe, in other words, if we have a European entity, a European Union which has the power to act. The second reason though, and this was clearly demonstrated again by the war in Kosovo, and perhaps the various lessons history has taught us also have a role to play here, particularly in central Europe, is that there can only be one form of security for this continent. We cannot permit nationalism, racism, and what amounts to a primitive and crude form of fascism, to take hold on this continent. Since 1992, we have tried everything in order to convince Milosevic to abandon this policy. I took part in the final stages of the talks at Rambouillet right through to the beginning of the military action and I did not meet anyone on the Western side, even amongst the Americans, who was behaving like a war-monger, but rather everyone was striving for compromise up to the proverbial last minute. The only party not interested in a compromise was Milosevic and the government in Belgrade. I personally had a two and a half hour long discussion with Milosevic, and for one of those hours there was no one else present. Should we have sat back? Should we have said that we would like to help, but we cannot, as it would offend our pacifist principles and we have no resolution from the UN Security Council? The UN is stronger today as a result of this conflict, and this is one of the effects of Europe"s role during this conflict. The Security Council is stronger today, unlike after Bosnia, which weakened it. I think that we should acknowledge that... (Applause)"@en1
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